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How do trade policy shocks affect import and consumer prices? How does the
impact on prices vary across consumers? Answers to these questions would help us
better understand the transmission mechanism of trade policy shock and its implica-
tions for consumer welfare.
In my dissertation, I provide both theoretical and empirical evidence to these ques-
tions.1 The first chapter examines the pass-through of import prices into consumer
prices and the welfare implications of trade policy shocks. Using a novel dataset with
both US import prices and barcode-level consumer prices, I find that the pass-through
of import prices to consumer prices is incomplete: a 1% increase in import prices leads
to a 0.3 to 0.4% increase in consumer prices. To explain these findings, I build on
Burstein and Gopinath (2014) to model the retail margin with variable markups. I
show that the pass-through rate depends on the magnitude of distribution margin
and the markup elasticity.
In the second chapter, I extend the theoretical framework to explore the hetero-
geneity in pass-through rates across consumers. I show that a differential pass-through
arises through two channels. The first one captures the fact that the pass-through
rate varies across retail outlets for the same variety and the second channel focuses
on the different expenditure shares across varieties with heterogeneous pass-through
1The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen data are those of the researcher(s) and do not reflect
the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in analyzing
and preparing the results reported herein.
rates. Exploiting the rich demographic information in Nielsen barcode data, I find
that the pass-through rate is higher for consumers with lower income and in mar-
kets with higher retail industry competition. By decomposing the consumer-specific
price index, I show that the differential pass-through rates are largely driven by the
differences in expenditure shares across varieties.
I then conduct a quantitative exercise and show that the consumer prices of af-
fected goods would increase 1-2% on average in response to a 25% tariff on consumer
goods from China. The increases in prices are 50% higher for lower income and higher
for consumers living in big cities of the Northeast region and West Coast.
The final chapter investigates the effect of trade policy uncertainty on US imports
from China during the trade war episode. By comparing the differences in imports
before and after the announcement of tariffs across products, I find that the decline
in imports after tariff announcement is larger for products with larger increase in
uncertainty (risk), which suggests uncertainty reduces imports. Furthermore, I find
the intensive margin, the adjustment within HS10 products, plays a more important
role in reducing imports. There is no significant difference in entry and exit rate
across products with different changes in risk.
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Chapter 1




In the past decades, trade barriers have continued to decrease all over the world,
thus bringing gains to consumers through lower prices and more varieties. However,
in recent years, we have witnessed a reversal of trade policy, through both higher
import tariffs and higher policy uncertainty. How do these trade policy shocks affect
consumer prices? In particular, how do import price changes caused by such shocks
pass on to consumers? Does the import price pass-through vary across consumers,
thus generating additional distributional effects? Answering these questions would
help us better understand the welfare implications and the distribution consequences
of trade policy shocks. The existing literature has paid little attention to tariff pass-
1
through, possibly due to the lack of variation in tariffs in the past years.1 However, as
the trade barriers increase dramatically in the recent trade war, an emerging literature
examines the tariff pass-through into import prices. For example, Amiti et al (2019)
and Khandelwal et al (2019) both find that the pass-through of tariffs into import
prices at the border is complete, at least in the short-run.2 However, we do not know
how much of that increase in prices at the border is passed through to the prices the
consumers pay at retail outlets and its welfare implications for consumers.
Using a unique dataset that links detailed US import prices with barcode-level
consumer prices, I address the question by estimating the pass-through from import
to consumer prices during the Great Trade Collapse (GTC). I find that the import
price pass-through to consumer prices is incomplete: a 1% increase in import prices
would lead to a 0.3 to 0.4% increase in consumer prices. In addition, the pass-through
rate is increasing in the import penetration of the industry.
A key challenge in identifying the import price pass-through is the endogeneity of
import prices. To address this problem, I exploit the exogeneous variation in changes
in trade policy uncertainty (TPU) across industries during the GTC. I show that the
changes in TPU affected import prices across industries and thus can be used as an
instrument for changes in import prices to identify the pass-through rate.
To explain the empirical findings, I develop a theoretical framework linking import
prices and consumer prices following Burstein and Gopinath (2014). The framework
features nontradable distribution margin and variable markups in the retail/wholesale
sector, both of which could lead to incomplete pass-through. Specifically, the pass-
through rate of import prices depends on: 1) the distribution margin, as prices of non-
1One exception is Feenstra (1989), in which he estimated the pass-through of tariffs to prices
of Japanese automobiles in 1980s. Other relevant studies mostly focus on how the decline in input
tariffs affected manufacturing or export prices (Khandelwal et al (2016); Amiti et al (2018)) during
the trade liberalization episodes.
2It is a surprising result given that the existing literature has documented incomplete pass-
through of exchange rate shocks. It is also inconsistent with the estimated export supply elasticity
in Broda, Weinstein and Limão (2008), which implies incomplete tariff pass-through.
2
tradable goods are insensitive to price shocks at the border; 2) the markup elasticity,
which captures how retailers adjust their markups when facing a cost shock.
1.2 Literature
This paper contributes to the literature that examines the tariff or exchange-rate
pass-through. Most of the existing literature focuses on how exchange rate shocks
affect import prices and consumer prices. As reviewed by Burstein and Gopinath
(2014), they find that the exchange rate pass-through is incomplete and the pass-
through into consumer prices is well below that into border prices.3 For tariff pass-
through, dating back to 1980s, Feenstra (1989) finds the symmetry of exchange rate
and tariff pass-through in the automobiles industry and shows that the tariff pass-
through ranges from 0.6 to unity depending on the products. Other studies mostly
focus on how the decline in trade barriers in trade liberalization episodes have affected
prices (Amiti et al (2018); Jaravel and Sager (2019); Bai and Stumpner (2019)). For
example, Jaravel and Sager (2019) find that the increased import penetration from
China leads to a decline in consumer prices in the US, mostly due to the strategic
complementarity of pricing decisions of domestic firms. In a similar study, Bai and
Stumpner (2019) find that the imports from China decreased US consumer prices
through lower prices of existing varieties and product entry. Using a similar dataset
as the latter, I instead focus on transmission of import prices to consumers thus have
more general implication on how trade shock affected consumer prices.
An emerging line of research starts to examine the price effect of US import tariffs
during the recent trade war (Amiti et al (2019); Fajgelbaum et al (2019)). They
find that the import tariffs are completely passed through into prices paid by US
importers, at least in the short run. The results are at odds with previous findings of
3For the US, they find that the pass-through is at least twice as high into border prices as it is
into retail prices.
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incomplete pass-through but also raise the question of how much of increases in prices
at the border would pass through to the prices at the retail outlets. This paper ad-
dresses the question by estimating the import price pass-through into consumer prices
using detailed price information. Contemporary to my work, two papers examine the
pass-through of US tariffs to consumer prices. Flaaen, Hortacsu and Tintelnot (2019)
estimate the price effect of US import tariffs on a specific consumer good: washing
machines. They find that the pass-through of tariffs to consumer prices is negative
for country-specific duties as multinationals shifted productions to tariff-free coun-
tries. However, the tariff elasticity is larger than one for 2018 tariffs that are imposed
on all sourcing countries, mostly drive by the strategic pricing behavior by compet-
ing domestic firms. In another paper, Cavallo et al (2019) estimate the increase in
prices both at the border and at the retail outlet using BLS data. Consistent with
my finding, they find the retail price response to tariffs is small. By exploring the
heterogeneous pass-through across consumers, this paper is closely related to Cravino
and Levchenko (2017), which study the distributional effect of large exchange rate
devaluations on consumers at different income levels. Following their work, this paper
also explores how the differences in distribution margin shape the distributional ef-
fects across consumers. However, I allow for variable markups, which is an additional
margin that would cause distributional effects.
This paper also is related to recent studies on trade policy uncertainty. Handley
and Limão (2017) examine the effect of TPU on imports and import prices from China
during its accession to WTO. They find that the decreased TPU led to export entry
and technology upgrading of existing exporters, thus pushing down the import prices
from China. Carballo et al (2018) focus on the increase in TPU during the Great
Trade Collapse and its effect on export dynamics. Following their work, I explore the
relationship between TPU and import prices during the GTC and use it as the basis
of my empirical strategy.
4
1.3 Theoretical Framework
To examine how the changes in import prices are transmitted to consumer prices,
I first develop a theoretical framework linking import prices and consumer prices
following Burstein and Gopinath (2014). In this step, I derive a theoretically consis-
tent import price pass-through into consumer prices by focusing on price changes of
varieties that exist in both periods.
Suppose there is a retail/wholesale sector that distribute varieties from the port







= cvtγvt(cvt; ξvt) (1.1)
where pTvt is the price of variety v at the dock. If it is a domestic variety, it presents the
price at the factory gate. The retailer combines the good with distribution services
in a Cobb-Douglas way with ηv represents the cost share of distribution service.
Distribution service includes domestic transportation cost, marketing cost that uses
the non-tradable goods and its price is pNt . We call ηv the distribution margin of
variety v and assume non-tradable price pNt is not responsive to price shocks at the
border. The retailer then charges a markup γvt over its marginal cost cvt. We allow
retailers to charge variable markups, which depends on its marginal cost and a demand
parameter ξvt.
5
4A variety can be any disaggregated good within a product category. In my empirical analysis,
a variety is defined at the barcode level.
5Burnstein and Gopinath (2015) and Arkolakis (2017) review several models that would lead to
variable markup including non-CES demand such as Kimball demand and oligoplistic competition
as in Atkenson and Burnstein (2008). The idea is that heterogeneous firms would charge variable
markups as elasticity of demand varies across firms. As shown in Arkolakis (2017) and Amiti et al
(2018), firm’s markup and cost pass-through depend on the relative price of the firm or the price
vector the firm faces.
5
Re-writing equation (1.1) in logs:
ln prvt = (1− ηv) ln pTvt + ηv ln pNt + ln γvt(cvt; ξvt) (1.2)
We define variety pass-through as ρv =
∂ ln prvt
∂ ln pTvt
, which captures how price shocks





= (1− ηv)(1− θv) (1.3)
where θv = −∂ ln γvt∂ ln cvt , and we call it markup elasticity. Markup elasticity represents
how variety’s markup respond to cost shock. In the case of CES with monopolist
competition, markup is constant and markup elasticity equals to zero. Thus the
variety pass-through only depends on the distribution margin. In other scenario,
when retailers engage in oligopolistic competition or face non-CES demand, markup
elasticity could be positive as retailers absorb part of the cost.
As equation (1.3) makes clear, variety pass-through can be incomplete (less than
one) due to the existence of distribution margin and variable markups. Because the
prices of non-tradable goods are insensitive to import price shocks, the higher the
distribution margin, the lower the pass-through. As markup elasticity captures how
the markup responds to cost shock, the higher the markup elasticity, retailers absorb
more of the cost shock, which in term results in lower pass-through.
As we cannot track the same variety from border to retail outlet, we aggregate
price changes at variety level to product category level. For the purpose of deriving
pass-through, we use varieties that exist in both periods. Log changes in consumer







6For simplicity, we assume it does not vary over time.
6
The weight wvt is the expenditure share of each variety v, which can be fixed or vary
over time depending on how we define price index. For example, official CPI use
fixed weights, so wvt = wv. Sato-vartia weights vary over time because they take into
account the substitution effect in response to price change.
Note that the changes in retail price of variety v can be written as a function of
variety pass-through and changes in import price/factory-gate price of variety v:
∆ ln prvt = ρv∆ ln p
T
vt + ηv(1 + θv)∆ ln p
N
t (1.5)












wvtηv(1 + θv) (1.6)
By distinguishing between imported goods and domestic goods, I have:


















+δ̃∆ ln pNt (1.7)
where δ̃ =
∑
wvtηv(1+θv). Here I assume the variety pass-through is the same across
imported (domestic) varieties in product category g. sIgt is the expenditure share on
imported goods in product category g, whereas wIvt and w
D
vt are the expenditure share
of a variety v within imported goods and domestic goods separately.






vt . Here I
assume the same weight in consumption basket and in imported bundle, which is
reasonable given the goods we focus on are mostly final goods. Similarly, I define






vt . I can rewrite the
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above equation (1.7) as:






gt + (1− sIgt)ρDg ∆ lnPDgt + δ̃∆ ln pNt (1.8)
I define import price pass-through at product category level as the changes in con-
sumer prices in response to changes in import prices of the same product category. As
we can see in equation (1.8), the pass-through into consumer prices depends on the
interaction of the import share sIgt and variety pass-through ρ
I
g. The latter one is a
function of distribution margin and markup elasticity. In addition, the changes in do-
mestic price ∆ lnPDgt might be a function of changes in import prices for two reasons:
first, the strategic complementarities in pricing decisions of domestic and foreign ex-
porters (Feenstra and Weinstein(2017); Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings(2018)); second,
the use of imported intermediates in production of domestic goods. To fully account
for the response of consumer prices, we might need to take into account both the
direct effect of import prices and the indirect effect through domestic prices. Next, I
discuss how I take equation (1.8) into data.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Data and Measurement
To estimate the import price pass-through to consumer prices, I use a merged dataset
from two data sources. The first one is the US quarterly import data during 2004Q1-
2011Q4, which is available through US Census Bureau. This dataset contains customs
value (CIF), quantity and unit value for each HS10-country combination. Our sample
has 68 exporting countries, which include all US major trading partners and account
for over 80% of total imports into the US.
The second dataset is the Consumer Panel from AC Nielsen company during
8
the same period and is available through Kilts marketing center of University of
Chicago. Nielsen Consumer Panel (Nielsen data hereafter) contains transaction-level
information such as price, quantities on barcoded goods from a representative sample
of households in the US. In addition, it includes detailed household demographic and
geographic information such as household income, size, zip-code etc. The products
in Nielsen data are mostly consumer packaged goods, which account for about 30%
of all expenditures on goods in CPI (Broda and Weinstein, 2010).
To merge the two datasets, I use a concordance developed by Bai and Stumpner
(2018) which matches HS-6 digits in trade data with product codes (“product mod-
ule”) in Nielsen data. The concordance covers 1175 HS6-digit codes and 1246 product
modules, generating 359 new product categories.7 The matched HS6s accounts for
approximately 20% of total import value and mostly are final goods imports.
In addition, I obtain industrial PPI at NAICS level from two data sources. The
first one is NBER-CES database, which is reported yearly, while the second one is
quarterly-based PPI from BLS.
I calculate consumer price index for each product category using information in
Nielsen data. The consumer price index is defined as a weighted average of price







where a variety is defined as a barcode (UPC). The price changes are calculated as the
difference of (log) unit value at time t relative to that in the corresponding quarter of
2004. I use the expenditure share at base periods as weight. The calculated quarterly
price index co-moves well with CPI, in particular, the food component of CPI as
presented in Appendix Figure 1.A.1.
7For example, the new product category “plain pasta” include 10 product modules ranging from
Spaghetti to Lasagna, and 2 HS6s which are “unstuffed pasta that made with or without eggs”.
9
Import price index is calculated for the same product category using detailed im-
port data, with a variety defined as a HS10-country. As the variety is more aggregated







is, the import price of a HS10-country combination V is the weighted average of the
import prices at (unobserved) barcode-equivalent level (v).
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Import and Consumer Prices
Pre-Crisis Crisis Overall
Changes in Consumer Prices (∆ lnPRgt) 0.044 0.146 0.090
[0.117] [0.173] [0.154]
Changes in Import Prices (∆ ln pIgt) 0.057 0.224 0.133
[0.580] [0.655] [0.621]
Observations 3,577 2,971 6,548
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in the bracket. The Pre-Crisis
period is defined as 2005Q1-2008Q3 and the Crisis period is defined as
2008Q4-2011Q4. All prices changes are relative to the corresponding quar-
ter of 2004.
Table 3.3 reports the summary statistics of changes in import prices and consumer
prices during the sample period. Column 1 is for pre-crisis period (2005Q1-2008Q3)
and column 2 is for crisis period (2008Q4-2011Q4). As we see, both import and
consumer prices increases during this period and the increase is larger during the
crisis period. In addition, the import prices exhibit more variation than consumer
prices.
1.4.2 Identification Strategy
Equipped with price indices, I take equation (1.8) into data by estimating the follow-
ing equation:
∆ lnPRgt = α + β∆ lnP
I
gt + γ∆ lnP
D
gt + δt + εgt (1.10)
where ∆ lnPRgt and ∆ lnP
I
gt are changes in consumer prices and import prices of
product category g respectively. I control for changes in domestic prices using US
10
industrial PPI. In doing so, I build a concordance between 359 product categories
and 262 NAICS 6-digit industries.8 I add time fixed effects to capture the changes
in prices of non-tradable goods and other macro economic shocks that could affect
all products equally. Because all price indices are calculated as price changes, the
product fixed effects are differenced out.
One key challenge to identify the pass-through is the endogeneity of import prices.
For example, a product-level demand shock would drive both import and consumer
prices into the same direction, thus overestimating the effect. It is also possible that
protectionism movement, that was prevalent during this period and can be product-
specific, could cause import prices and consumer prices to change in opposite di-
rection. In addition, the import prices could potentially have measurement error
as we don’t have barcode-level import prices, then the OLS estimate is subject to
attenuation bias.
The event of Great Trade Collapse (GTC) provides us a unique setting to iden-
tify the import price pass-through as it generates exogeneous variations in import
prices. During the 2008 financial crisis, as the economic condition worsened, there
was widespread discussion of a possible trade war (Carballo et al, 2018). Though
eventually the trade war didn’t happen, it caused substantial increase in trade policy
uncertainty during this period. Figure 1 plots the news-based trade policy uncertainty
index constructed by Carballo et al (2018) and the average applied tariffs during this
period. As we see, though the applied tariffs barely change, trade policy uncertainty
increased substantially, especially in 2008Q4.
More importantly, the increases in TPU cause variations in import prices across
industries. Recent studies, for example Handley and Limão (2017), have found that
the import prices decreased more in industries with a larger decline in TPU during
China’s accession to WTO. Following their work, I show that an increase in TPU
8I first use the concordance between NAICS6 and HS6 by Pierce and Schott(2009) and then link
HS6 with product categories.
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Figure 1.1: US Import Tariffs and Trade Policy Uncertainty
Notes: The news-based TPU index is constructed by Carballo et al (2018) and represents the
mentions of “uncertainty” or “uncertain” in the set of articles about international trade or trade
policy in major US newspapers. The US average imported tariffs are calculated as the weighted
average of applied MFN tariffs.
during the GTC has led to lower import prices by exploiting variations in TPU
across industries. More specifically, using US quarterly import data from 2004Q1-
2011Q4, I find that the lower import prices are mainly driven by the lower prices
of continuing varieties in industries that experience a larger increase in TPU. The
results are reported in Appendix B.
More specifically, the different risk faced by each industry is measured by the gap
between MFN tariffs and column-2 tariffs following Handley and Limão(2017). The
basic idea is that in the case of trade war, the U.S. might switch to non-cooperative
tariffs, which are product-specific and can be proxied by column-2 tariffs.9 Moreover,
as column-2 tariffs are set in Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, the resulting risk measure
is exogenous to other product-level shocks during the financial crisis. Therefore, the
downward risk faced by industry i is measured as:
9Broda, Weinstein and Limão (2008) show the relationship between optimal non-cooperative
tariffs and column-2 tariffs are positive.
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where τ i2 and τ
i
m are column 2 and MFN tariff rate for industry i respectively.
10 The
downward risk is therefore measuring the proportion of profit loss if the worst-case
tariffs (column-2) realize.
The arrival of financial crisis in 2008 indicates an increase in uncertainty, in partic-
ular, an increase in the probability of switching to non-cooperative tariffs (column-2).
Thus the uncertainty shock could be measured by either a crisis dummy, which equals
to one during 2008Q4-2011Q4 and zero otherwise, or a time-varying news index, which
captures the overall sentiment of trade policy uncertainty over time. As shown in Fig-
ure 1, the quarterly news-based TPU index increased from an average of 0.026 before
the crisis to 0.040 during the crisis. Especially, it shows an three-fold increased from
2008Q3 to 2008Q4, when the crisis just began. I therefore use the interaction be-
tween industrial risk level (Riski) and the time-varying uncertainty measure (Crisist
or Newst) as the instrument for changes in import prices.
Due to similar reasons, the changes in domestic prices are endogeneous as well.
I instrument industrial PPI with one plausibly exogeneous cost shock: the changes
in energy prices. To do so, I interact the prices of five major energy sources with
their corresponding cost shares in each industry.11 Their annual price information
is obtained through SEDS (State Energy Data System) of EIA. I use the average
prices per BTU across the US to avoid any endogeneity issue. The expenditures
data is available through Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS), which
reports each manufacturing industry’s expenditures (in Million US dollars) on these
five sources of energy every 4 years. I use the data from 2006.
10In the baseline, the column 2 and MFN tariff rates for each industry are calculated as the
simple average of HS8-level tariff rates. The elasticity of substitution σtakes the value of 3 following




The results are reported in the Appendix C.
11The five major energy includes: electricity, natural gas, residual fuel oil, distillate fuel and coal.
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1.4.3 Estimation Results
Table 1.2: Import-Consumer Price Pass-through
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
Changes in Import Prices 0.014*** 0.366*** 0.338***
(0.003) (0.097) (0.088)
Industrial PPI 0.180*** 0.524*** 0.486***
(0.014) (0.107) (0.078)
Instrument TPU× Crisis TPU× News
First Stage F-Statistics 8.30 7.98
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
N 5819 5635 5635
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. In both IV regressions, I instrument industrial
PPI with changes in energy prices. The Cragg-Donald F statistics is 8.30 for column 2,
which exceeds Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value of 7.03 (10% significance level) for two
endogeneous variables and two instruments. The Cragg-Donald F statistics is 7.98 for column
3.
Table 1.2 reports the results from the OLS and IV estimations. As we can see in
Column 1, the OLS estimate is significant but small. However, after we instrument
changes in import prices and domestic prices, the magnitude of coefficient increases
substantially. Based on our IV estimates, the pass-through is between 0.3-0.4, sug-
gesting that a one percent increase in import prices will lead to a 0.3 to 0.4 percent
increase in consumer prices.12 The first stage results are reported in Appendix Table
1.A.1.
In the baseline, I present the results using PPI from NBER-CES database. I
do robustness check using BLS PPI and the results are reported in Appendix Table
??. To address the concern that there might be product-specific trend in prices, I
control for department fixed effects in the robustness check. The results are similar
and reported in Appendix Table 1.A.3.
12As reviewed by Gopinath and Burnstein(2015), the exchange rate pass-through at least twice
as high into border prices as it is into retail prices for the U.S..
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1.4.4 Accounting for Domestic Prices
As we discussed before, the domestic prices could potentially respond to import price
changes due to two reasons: strategic complementarity and changes in production
cost, i.e, the use of imported inputs in producing domestic goods. To fully capture the
changes in consumer prices in response to import price changes, I take into account the
indirect effect through domestic prices. To do so, I estimate the changes in domestic
prices that are caused by import price shock and combine it with the domestic price
pass-through we estimate to compute the overall effect.
Table 1.3: Response of Domestic Prices to Import Price Changes
NBER-CES BLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in Import Prices 1.391* 1.722** 1.760* 1.835**
(0.574) (0.600) (0.768) (0.662)
Instrument TPU× Crisis TPU× News TPU× Crisis TPU× News
First-Stage F Statistics 7.58 8.96 8.32 10.47
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5750 5750 5771 5771
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. The first two columns use NBER-CES PPI whereas the last two columns use
BLS PPI.
Table 1.3 reports the estimation results for two PPI measures. As before, I in-
strument import prices with changes in TPU to address the endogeneity issue. The
pass-through from import prices to domestic PPI is estimated to be roughly 1.4 after
instrument and for PPI from NBER-CES database (column 1), which indicates that 1
percentage point increase in import prices cause about 1.4 percentage point increase
in domestic prices. The large response of domestic prices is consistent with find-
ings in the literature (e.g., Jaravel and Sager (2019); Flaaen, Hortacsu and Tintelnot
(2019)), which suggest that competition between import and domestic goods drives
the changes in domestic prices. As we mostly focus on final goods, the competition
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effect might play a more important role as well.13
Combining it with our estimates of pass-through in Table 1.2, a one percentage
point increase in import prices could lead to a 0.73 percentage point (1.39*0.528)
increase in consumer prices through its indirect effect on domestic prices, which is
even larger in magnitude compared with the direct effect of import prices.
Overall, when taking into account both direct and indirect effect, one percent in-
crease in import prices would cause the consumer prices of the same product category
to increase about 1.1 percentage point. Using estimates for BLS PPI (column 3) gives
us similar results.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines how did the changes in import prices caused by trade policy
shock transmit to consumers during the GTC. I develop a theoretical framework
linking import prices and consumer prices following Burstein and Gopinath (2014).
The incomplete pass-through could arise both from the non-tradable distribution
margin and variable markups in distribution sector. By exploiting the exogeneous
variations in trade policy uncertainty across industries, I estimate that the import
price pass-through ranges from 0.3 to 0.4 after using changes in TPU as an instrument
for import prices. Consistent with theoretical prediction, the pass-through rate is
increasing in industrial import penetration. Lastly, I show that the import prices
could have an indirect effect on consumer prices through its impact on domestic
prices. Accounting for this channel, a one percentage point increase in import prices
could lead to about a 1.1 percentage point increase in consumer prices.
13Of the 359 product categories, only 34 of them contain intermediates according to BEC. One
example is “plumbing accessories” which belongs to the household supplies category. Those are
goods that are mostly used as intermediates, but also can be directly consumed by consumers.
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Appendix
1.A Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 1.A.1: Nielsen Consumer Prices vs CPI
Notes: The CPI price indices are obtained from FRED database and have a base period of 2004Q1.
1.B TPU and Import Prices
In this section, I examine the effect of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) shock on import
prices during the GTC. Recent literature documents that TPU affected imports and
import prices. In particular, Handley and Limão (2017) show that the import prices
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Table 1.A.1: Import Price Pass-through: First Stage
Changes in Import Prices PPI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TPU× Crisis -0.167** -0.214***
(0.059) (0.022)
TPU× News -3.508** -5.558***
(1.075) (0.409)
Energe Prices(log) 0.100*** 0.096** 0.020*** 0.013**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.004) (0.004)
F-Statistics 11.70 13.63 55.27 92.78
N 5834 5834 5992 5992
R-Squared 0.033 0.033 0.187 0.202
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01.
Table 1.A.2: Import-Consumer Price Pass-through: BLS PPI
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
Changes in Import Prices 0.007** 0.563*** 0.584***
(0.002) (0.168) (0.155)
Industrial PPI 0.076*** 0.300** 0.311***
(0.011) (0.096) (0.086)
Instrument TPU× Crisis TPU× News
First-Stage F Statistics 7.18 7.83
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
N 5841 5629 5629
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01.
Table 1.A.3: Import-Consumer Price Pass-through: Department FE
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV IV
Changes in Import Prices 0.013*** 0.415* 0.266*
(0.004) (0.231) (0.148)
Industrial PPI 0.178*** 0.502*** 0.477***
(0.014) (0.106) (0.075)
Instrument TPU× Crisis TPU× News
First-Stage F Statistics 7.35 8.02
Department FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
N 5819 5635 5635
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. In both IV regressions, I instrument industrial PPI
with changes in energy prices. There are seven department categories in Nielsen data.
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from China decreased more in industries with higher initial TPU during China’s
accession to WTO.
Following their work, I exploit the variations in changes in TPU across industries.
As shown in Figure 1, trade policy uncertainty in general increased during the crisis.
More importantly, there is heterogeneity in TPU across industries because the poten-
tial threat tariffs are product-specific. Handley and Limão (2017) model trade policy
uncertainty by allowing for three policy states: high, low and intermediate. The in-
termediate state is characterized by tariffs between high and low protection and that
could change to either states with some probability. In our empirical setting, the
trade policy was in intermediate state, specifically, low protection state (MFN tariff),
before the crisis. The arrival of the crisis indicates an increase in probability of chang-
ing into high protection state, i.e, non-cooperative import tariffs.14 We can therefore
measure the increase in TPU each industry experienced during the crisis using the
differences in MFN tariffs and non-cooperative tariffs (Column 2). Specifically, we
define TPU for industry i as the following:




where τ i2 and τ
i
m are Column 2 and MFN tariff for industry i respectively. In the
baseline, I define an industry at the HS6-digit level and the industrial tariffs are
the average of tariffs across HS8s within that industry. According to Handley and
Limão(2017), in a standard trade model with TPU, it represents the potential profit
loss if high protection state realizes.15
The definition of the import price index follows Feenstra(1994) and Broda and
14In Handley and Limão(2017), when at the intermediate state, tariffs could change with proba-
bility γ, with λ to high protection and 1 − λ to low protection state. In our empirical application,
the intermediate state has tariff levels that are equal to low protection state. Thus, the probabilities
of changing tariffs (γ) and changing to high protection (λ) are equivalent.
15In the empirical analysis, I use σ=3 following Handley and Limão(2017).
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where lnPict is the log import price index of product i from country c at time t.
The first component on the RHS is a weighted average of price changes of continuing
varieties in that product-country cell, with sato-vatia weight wt which takes into
account of the substitution across periods. ∆ ln pt(ω) is the log changes in variety-
level prices and a variety is defined as a HS10-country combination. The second
component accounts for the entry and exit of varieties, where λict is the expenditure
share of continuing varieties in all varieties at period t. Thus, the variety component
increases as more varieties exit (lower λict−1) or less varieties enter (higher λt).
To calculate the import price index, I use US quarterly import data from 68 coun-
tries during 2004Q1-2011Q4.16 The sample includes all US major trading partners
and imports from these countries account for more than 85% of all imports in 2004.
The list of countries is in Appendix.
I estimate the effect of TPU on import prices by the following equation:
∆ lnPict =β1Crisist × TPUi + β2Crisist × TPUi × PTAct+
β3TPUi × PTAct + β4TPUi + δct + εict
(1.14)
where ∆ lnPict is the changes in import prices relative to the corresponding quarter
in 2004. Crisist is a dummy variable that equals to one for periods during 2008Q4-
2011Q4, and equals to zero otherwise. I control for country-specific supply shocks
using country by time fixed effects (δct). I also divide exporting countries into PTA
and non-PTA countries based on whether or not it has a Preferential Trade Agreement
(PTA) with the United States. As shown by Carballo et al (2018), credible trade
16The data is publicly available through US Census Bureau.
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agreement could potentially reduce TPU as it provides extra commitment to trade
policy relative to WTO.
Table 1.B.1: TPU and Import Prices
Continuing Varieties Aggregate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TPU×Crisis -0.072*** -0.068*** 0.019*** 0.015*** -0.053*** -0.052***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011)
TPU -0.014* 0.005** -0.009
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
TPU×Crisis×PTA -0.033 -0.027 -0.001 0.001 -0.034 -0.026
(0.021) (0.020) (0.008) (0.007) (0.022) (0.021)
TPU×PTA 0.015 0.011 -0.004 -0.004 0.010 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.014)
Country*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS6 FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 795590 795573 795590 795573 795590 795573
R-Squared 0.018 0.048 0.005 0.050 0.017 0.049
Table 1.B.2: TPU and Import Prices: Matched Sample with Nielsen
Continuing Varieties Aggregate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TPU×Crisis -0.050** -0.057*** 0.015* 0.013* -0.035* -0.045**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017)
TPU 0.031** 0.004 0.035***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
TPU×Crisis×PTA -0.017 -0.012 -0.022 -0.019 -0.040 -0.031
(0.033) (0.032) (0.014) (0.013) (0.035) (0.035)
TPU×PTA 0.061** 0.057** -0.004 -0.009 0.057** 0.048*
(0.020) (0.021) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.022)
Country*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS6 FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 255750 255749 255750 255749 255750 255749
R-Squared 0.027 0.050 0.011 0.064 0.026 0.054
Table 1.B.1 represents the baseline results, where I use import price index defined
at HS6-country level.17 The first two columns use the price changes of continuing
varieties as dependent variable. From the first column, we see that TPU has a sig-
nificantly negative effect on import prices of continuing varieties during the crisis.
17Due to the measurement error in unit values, I trim observations with values that fall outside
of median+/-3IQR range. These outliers account for about 3% of all observations.
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The significant negative sign before TPUi indicates that TPU had a negative effect
even before the crisis. In addition, there is no significant difference between PTA
and non-PTA countries in terms of the impact of TPU. In Column 2, I control for
product-specific trend using fixed effect, and the results are similar.
To explain the negative effects, note that a variety is defined as a HS10-country
combination. If the increased TPU induced less productive (potentially higher priced)
firms to exit within the product-country category, the (average) unit value for the
variety could be lower as the remaining firms are more productive and charging lower
prices. In addition to the exit effect, it is possible that firms temporarily lowered
their prices when facing higher TPU during the crisis with the expectation that TPU
would decrease after the crisis.
Column 3-4 use the variety component as dependent variable. As we see in column
3, β1 is positive and significant, implying that in industries with higher TPU, there
were more varieties exit and/or less varieties entry during the crisis. This is consistent
with the theory that higher TPU would deter export entry if there is sunk entry cost.
When adding the two component of price indices, the overall effect of TPU is negative
as the price effect of continuing varieties outweigh the variety exit effect (column 5
and 6).
The results are robust when we use a matched sample of HS6s with Nielsen (Table
1.B.2). Products in Nielsen are mostly consumer packaged goods and constitute about
one fifth of all import value. As we can see in Table 1.B.2, the magnitude of negative
effect is slightly smaller and the signs and significance are the same with that in Table
1 except that the effect of TPU is positive before the crisis. I also do robustness checks
using HS4 by country import price index. The results are reported in Appendix.
Because Crisis dummy hardly capture the variations in TPU over time, I replace
it with the News-based TPU index as depicted in Figure 1. The regression results
are reported in Table 1.B.3. For news index, I normalize it to have mean zero and
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standard deviation of one. As we see, the results are similar to the specifications that
use Crisis dummy. Table 1.B.4 provide robustness checks at the HS-4 industrial level.
Table 1.B.3: TPU and Import Prices: News-Based TPU Index
Continuing Varieties Aggregate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TPU×News -0.026*** -0.025*** 0.005* 0.004 -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
TPU -0.046*** 0.013*** -0.032***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
TPU×News×PTA 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011)
TPU×PTA -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012)
Country*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS6 FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 795590 795573 795590 795573 795590 795573
R-Squared 0.018 0.048 0.005 0.050 0.017 0.049
Table 1.B.4: TPU and Import Prices: HS4 by Country
Continuing Varieties Aggregate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TPU×Crisis -0.086*** -0.082*** 0.014 0.009 -0.072*** -0.073***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014)
TPU -0.025** -0.007 -0.031***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.009)
TPU×Crisis×PTA 0.019 0.024 0.011 0.016 0.030 0.039
(0.027) (0.026) (0.017) (0.016) (0.032) (0.030)
TPU×PTA -0.020 -0.025 -0.009 -0.008 -0.028 -0.033
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.019)
Country*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS4 FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 400226 400223 400226 400223 400226 400223
R-squared 0.028 0.054 0.009 0.055 0.024 0.054
In sum, I find that TPU has a negative impact on import prices during the GTC.
In particular, industries that experienced larger increase in TPU have lower import




across Consumers: Estimation and
Quantification
2.1 Introduction
In previous chapter, I discuss how shocks to import prices are passed through to the
aggregate consumer prices. However, there are substantial differences in prices faced
by consumers with different characteristics, even within the same product category.
One explanation for the price differences is the differential spending patterns across
products. For example, it is well established that high income consumers consume
more of high-quality and high priced products within a product category (e.g., Fa-
jgelbaum and Khandelwal (2017)). It could be also due to the fact that even for
the same good, consumers pay different prices as they shop in different retail outlets
(Handbury and Weinstein (2015); Handbury (2019)). Therefore, the shocks to prices
at the border could lead to differential price changes across consumers and cause
distributional consequences.
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In this chapter, I investigate the heterogeneity in pass-through rates across con-
sumers. To do so, I extend the theoretical framework in Chapter 1 to allow for hetero-
geneity in consumer prices. I show that a differential pass-through across consumers
could arise through two channels. The first one captures the fact that consumers shop
in different retail outlets for the same variety and the pass-through can be different
across retail outlets. The second channel focuses on the different expenditure shares
across varieties with different pass-through rates. For example, high income con-
sumers spend more on varieties of higher quality, which have different pass-through
rates than low-quality varieties.
In the empirical analysis, I explore the heterogeneity along two dimensions–income
and geographic location–by using the rich demographic and geographic information
in Nielsen data. I find that the pass-through rate is higher for consumers with lower
income and in more competitive markets, which is measured by Herfindahl Index in
local retail market.
I then investigate how each channel contributes to the differential pass-through
across consumers. A price decomposition shows that the differences in expenditure
shares across varieties with heterogeneous pass-through rates account for most of
the differential pass-through. That is, consumers with lower income and at more
competitive retail market spend more on varieties with higher pass-through rates.
For lower income consumers, the higher pass-through rate is possibly due to the
fact that lower quality varieties they consume exhibit lower distribution margin com-
pared with higher quality varieties and thus have higher pass-through rates. For
consumers at more competitive retail markets, the higher pass-through might be be-
cause they spend more on varieties from relatively small retailers which have lower
markup elasticity and thus higher pass-through rates.
This chapter contributes to the literature that studies the distributional conse-
quences of international trade. This line of research focuses on how international
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trade causes relative price changes both across sectors and within sectors and relates
it to differential price changes across consumers. For example, Fajgelbaum and Khan-
delwal (2017) incorporates non-homothetic demand in a quantitative model and find
that international trade is pro-poor because poor consumers spend more on sectors
with a larger trade intensity and a lower elasticity of substitution between domestic
and imported goods. Borusyak and Jaravel (2018) relax the assumption on demand
structure and use micro-data on expenditure shares across sectors and goods. They
show that consumers with various education levels have approximately the same ex-
penditure share on imported goods and the expenditure channel is therefore almost
neutral to different education groups. On the other hand, as price and expenditure
data at more disaggregated product-level becomes available, some papers start to ex-
amine the effect of specific events on consumer welfare using micro-level data. Faber
(2014) and Atkin, Faber and Navarro (2016) are two examples using barcode-level
data to study separate events (the first one is about NAFTA and the second is on the
arrival of foreign retail chains) on Mexican consumers. Similar to these studies, this
paper also uses barcode-level price and expenditures. However, these papers did not
distinguish between import prices and consumer prices. In contrast, this paper shows
that the existence of domestic distribution sector creates a wedge between import and
consumer prices and plays a role in generating distributional effects across consumers.
2.2 Consumer-specific Prices and Decomposition
In the first step, I define a consumer-specific price index by allowing for differences in
expenditure share across varieties and variety-level prices, both of which could lead
to differential pass-through. Specifically, the price index of product category g for
consumer z is defined as







where wzvt is the expenditure share on variety v for group z at time t and ∆ ln p
zr
vt
denotes the changes in prices of variety v for consumer z. The differences in variety-
level price changes could arise because consumers shop the same variety (UPC) in
different retail outlets or have different search intensity.
The differential import price pass-through across consumers depend on both fac-
tors. To see this, note that as consumers can pay different prices for the same variety,
the same cost shock would lead to differential price adjustment at the variety-level.
For example, a high and a low income consumer could buy the same imported good
from a high-end retail store and a discount store respectively. Following an import
price shock to that good, the two stores would adjust the prices on the shelf differently
for reasons such as different demand elasticity. Therefore, even if consumers have the
same expenditure share on each good, the differential price adjustment across retail
outlets could lead to differential pass-through. This is the first channel which I call
“outlet channel”. Second, as pass-through rates differ across varieties, the differential
expenditure shares across varieties could also cause differential overall pass-through
rate at the product category level. Again, the high income consumer could purchase
a high quality variety and the low income consumer could purchase a low quality one
within the same product category. If the pass-through rate varies across high and
low quality varieties, the category-level pass-through rate can also be different across
consumers. I call it the “composition channel”.
To investigate each channel in detail, I decompose the changes in consumer-specific
price index into three components following Cravino and Levchenko (2017):1
1Other papers such as Coibion et al (2015) use similar decomposition.
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where wvt is the average expenditure share on variety v and u
z
vt is the deviation in
expenditure share for consumer z from the average. Likewise, ∆ ln prvt is the average
change in (log) price for variety v and vzvt is the deviation in price changes for consumer
z from the average.
The first term uses the average expenditure share on each variety (across con-
sumers) as weight and allow changes in unit prices to be consumer-specific, capturing
the fact that consumers shop the same variety in different outlet thus facing differen-
tial retail price changes. The second term assumes the same change in variety-level
price but allows for different expenditure patterns across varieties, thus measuring
how differential expenditure shares across varieties contribute to the differential price
index. Finally, the last term is the correlation between two deviations. For example,
if high income consumers spend more on high quality goods, and the pass-through of
high quality goods is disproportionately higher for high income consumers.
The decomposition highlights mechanisms that could cause differential price changes
across consumers and therefore could be sources of heterogeneity in pass-through. In
the following, I link each component of consumer-specific price indices with changes
in import prices and investigate how each channel contributes to the differential pass-
through.
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2.2.1 The Outlet Channel
First, I examine how the price shocks in the border could cause differential changes in
retail price for the same variety v across consumers. Note that retail price of variety
v for group z can be written as:
ln pz,rvt = (1− ηzv) ln pTvt + ηzv ln pNt + ln γzvt(czvt; ξzvt) (2.3)
Here I assume the price at the dock pTvt is the same for all consumers. However, the
distribution margin, which captures the amount of domestic services being added to
imported goods, and markup, which captures distributors’ price setting behavior, can




= (1− ηzv)(1 +
∂ ln γzvt
∂ ln czvt
) = (1− ηzv)(1− θzv) (2.4)
As we can see in equation (2.4), variety pass-through varies across consumers because
of the differences in distribution margin and markup elasticity. These differences are
possibly due to the fact that consumers shop the same variety (UPC) in different
retail outlets and these retailer outlets attach different domestic services and have
different pricing decisions when facing the same cost shock. 2
Note that distribution margin ηv represents the proportion of non-tradable ser-
vices that are provided with imported goods to consumers. It naturally varies across
locations because of different domestic transportation costs. In addition, it could also
vary across locations due to the differences in rent, labor costs etc. In the case of
income, as high income consumers tend to shop in stores with higher amenity, these
stores usually attach more domestic services such as offering more customer services,
nicer shopping environment, thus having higher distribution margin.
Markup elasticity captures the fact that when facing the same cost shocks, the
2Another possible explanation is that consumers have different search intensity.
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markup adjustment could be different across retail outlets even for the same variety.
In terms of income, it is possible that the high-amenity stores that cater to the rich
have different markup elasticity due to the differences in demand elasticity between
the rich and the poor. For consumers at different locations, the differences in market
structure and local competition in retail industry can affect the markup elasticity.
For example, Smith (2018) documented an overall increase in concentration in re-
tail industry in the U.S and considerable variations in concentration levels across
locations.
Note that we can write the changes in variety retail price as a function of variety
pass-through and changes in prices at the dock:











Denote the first component of consumer price indices in equation (2.2) as ∆ lnP z,1gt
and re-write it:











gt + (1− sIgt)ρzg∆ lnPDgt + δ̃∆ lnPNt (2.6)
When deriving the second equality, we distinguish between domestic and imported
varieties and assume the variety pass-through is the same in product category g.
As we can see in equation (2.6), the expenditure share across imported and domestic
varieties is assumed to be the same across consumers. Therefore, if we find differential
pass-through into the first component of price indices across consumers, it captures
the differences in ρzg: the variety-level pass-through. Note that
ρzg = (1− ηzg)(1− θzg) (2.7)
The variety (product) pass-through is lower for consumers with higher distribution
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margin or higher markup elasticity. In other words, as consumers shop in different
retail stores for the same variety, it captures the heterogeneity in distribution margin
or markup elasticity across retailers.
2.2.2 The Expenditure Channel
The expenditure channel hinges on the fact that consumers consume different varieties
within a narrow product category. To the extent that there is heterogeneity in pass-
through across varieties in the same product category, the differential expenditure
pattern could also result in different pass-through. One example is product quality.
It is well know that high income consumers spend more on high quality varieties
within a narrow product category. The high quality varieties might have a different
pass-through rate than that of lower quality varieties due to differences in distribution
margin or markup elasticity. Another example is the size of retailers. Some consumers
tend to shop in large retail chains while others prefer small local stores. For example,
there is evidence that high income consumers tend to spend more on products from
large firms whereas low income consumers spend more on smaller firms (Faber and
Fally (2014)). The spending patterns might also vary across different markets as
some markets are dominated with a few large retailers while others have lots of local
retailers to choose from. There is evidence that large firms tend to have a larger
markup elasticity, i.e., they adjust their markup more intensively when facing cost
shocks, than small firms (Amiti et al, 2019). Therefore, the differences in expenditure
patterns across retailers of different size would result in differential pass-through rates
as well.
Note that in addition to the above mentioned reasons, the differences in expendi-
ture share across imported versus domestic varieties are also captured in this channel.
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To see this, denote the second term of equation (2.2) as ∆ lnP z,2gt and re-write it as:
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where sz,Igt and w
z,I
vt are the expenditure share on imported goods of consumer z and
the expenditure share on imported variety v within imported varieties respectively.
If we regress this component of price indices on a uniform import price index, the
coefficient would increase in consumers z’s expenditure share on imported varieties.
In other words, the import price has a larger impact on consumers that spend more
on imported goods.
Within imported varieties, the differential pass-through is determined by the in-
teraction between variety expenditure share wz,Ivt and variety pass-through ρv. All the
previously mentioned product characteristics including product quality, firm size are
captured in this interaction. For example, if consumers spend more on high quality
imported goods (higher wz,Ivt with v denotes the high quality varieties), and if the pass-
through of high quality variety ρv is lower, it would lead to overall lower pass-through
for this group of consumers.
In any case, if we find the differential effect is significantly positive (negative)
through this channel, it suggests this group of consumers spend more on varieties
that have higher (lower) pass-through. However, we are unable to identify which




2.3.1 Consumers with Different Income
To investigate whether the pass-through varies across consumers at different income
levels, in the first step, I construct income-specific consumer price index as in equa-
tion (2.1) exploiting the rich demographic information in Nielsen data. Specifically,
as a variety is defined as a unique UPC (barcode), I calculate the income-specific
expenditure share on each UPC within a product category and income-specific unit
price for each UPC. To avoid endogeneity issues, I use fixed expenditure share at the
base period.
I divide households into ten income bins according to their income level. As to
household income, I try two different measures. The first one is self-reported annual
income, which is not in exact numbers but in income ranges. The second one is
total spending by aggregating transaction-level expenditures in Nielsen data. Both
measures are adjusted for household size.3 I calculate income-specific price index for
each product category and ten income groups.4 Note that households with different
income might consume different bundles of varieties within the same product category.
Using the price changes of varieties consumed is equivalent to applying zero weights
to unconsumed varieties.
I estimate a reduced form equation on the income-specific price indices to deter-
mine the direction of the differential effect, for example, if there is larger impact on
low-income vs higher income. Because there are different forces affecting the pass-
through and the direction of each force can be contradicting, the overall impact on
different consumers is ambiguous in a theoretical perspective. Specifically, I estimate
3The correlation between the two measures is about 0.3.
4One can calculate household-level price index. However, as each household consumes a limited
number of varieties each period, we lose substantial price information when calculating price changes.
For this reason, we calculate group-specific price index.
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the following equation:
∆ lnPigt = α + β∆ lnP
I
gt + γ∆ lnP
I
gt ×Dz + ∆ lnPDgt + δzt + εzgt (2.9)
where ∆ lnPigt is the log changes in price index of income group i for product g.
∆ lnP Igt represents import price index of product g. Dz are income dummies. In the
baseline, I divide the ten income groups into two categories: high and low income.5 I
add income-time fixed effects to control for other shocks experienced by each income
group.
Table 2.1 reports the regression results based on IV estimation. I use reported
income in column 1-2 and total spending in column 3-4. As we can see in column 1-2,
the pass-through into consumer prices of lower income is significant higher compared
with that of higher income. The magnitude of the difference varies slightly across
specifications. Overall, the pass-through into lower income is about 30%−50% higher
than that into higher income. The results are robust to using total spending as income
measure.
Table 2.1: Import Price Pass-Through: Income
Reported Income Total Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in Import Prices 0.268*** 0.289*** 0.261*** 0.274***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031)
Imp × Lower Income 0.115*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.095***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Industrial PPI 0.401*** 0.419*** 0.441*** 0.455***
(0.035) (0.030) (0.036) (0.030)
Instrument TPU× Crisis TPU× News TPU× Crisis TPU× News
First-Stage F Statistics 117.6 111.5 115.2 108.8
Income*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 61215 61215 61093 61093
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. This table reports only IV estimation results with different instruments. In
all regressions, I use changes in energy prices to instrument for industrial PPI.
5I take the top 5 income groups as high income and the remaining 5 as low income
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To dig deeper into the heterogeneity across income groups, I divide the sample into
three categories: lower, middle and upper income.6 Table 2.2 reports the results for
three income categories. As we see, the pass-through into lowest income is significantly
higher than that of highest income group. However, according to column 1-2, the pass-
through into middle income group is not significantly different from that of highest
income. It suggests the differences in pass-through across high and low income groups
in previous table are mostly driven by the top and bottom income groups. Using total
spending as income measure in column 3-4, the results are slightly different. Both the
pass-through into lower income and middle income is significantly higher than that
into higher income. A test of equality shows that there is no significant difference in
pass-through between lower and middle income.
The results are robust to using other income measures including the total house-
hold income (total spending) without adjusting for household size, household income
(total spending) adjusting for size and other demographics. These results are reported
in Appendix Table 2.A.1 and Table 2.A.2.
Table 2.2: Import Price Pass-Through: 3 Income Categories
Reported Income Total Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in Import Prices 0.271*** 0.289*** 0.234*** 0.250***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033)
Imp × Lower Income 0.131*** 0.111*** 0.143*** 0.127***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Imp × Middle Income 0.037 0.039 0.088*** 0.083***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Industrial PPI 0.401*** 0.419*** 0.442*** 0.455***
(0.035) (0.030) (0.036) (0.030)
Instrument TPU× Crisis TPU× News TPU× Crisis TPU× News
First-Stage F Statistics 113.2 111.1 117.7 109.2
Income*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 61215 61215 61093 61093
Notes: ***p¡0.001, **p¡0.005, *p¡0.01. In all regressions, I use changes in energy prices to instrument for industrial PPI.
6As we cannot split ten income groups into 3 categories of equal size, I assign top 3 income groups
as upper income, bottom 3 groups as lower income and the middle 4 groups as middle income.
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Note that the domestic pass-through into the consumer prices could be hetero-
geneous across consumers with different income levels as well. The heterogeneous
response could be due to the similar reasons such as different spending patterns on
domestic goods. Therefore, in Table 2.3 I interact the changes in domestic prices with
high and low income dummies and instrument domestic prices with changes in energy
prices. Using the two different instruments for import prices gives us very different
results. Given the second instrument is subject to weak instrument problem, we focus
on the results in column 1 and 3. As we see, the pass-through of domestic prices is
slightly lower for lower income, which is in the opposite sign with the import price
pass-through.
Table 2.3: Heterogeneity in Domestic Price Pass-through
Reported Income Total Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in Import Prices 0.194*** 0.542*** 0.193*** 0.586***
(0.050) (0.130) (0.049) (0.143)
Imp Price× Lower Income 0.261*** -0.403 0.232** -0.506*
(0.075) (0.236) (0.075) (0.249)
Industrial PPI 0.413*** 0.390*** 0.454*** 0.411***
(0.037) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037)
PPI × Lower Income -0.020* 0.050* -0.018* 0.060*
(0.008) (0.025) (0.008) (0.027)
Instrument TPU× Crisis TPU× News TPU× Crisis TPU× News
First Stage F-Statistics 41.48 4.63 40.80 4.53
Income*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 61215 61215 61093 61093
Notes: ***p¡0.001, **p¡0.005, *p¡0.01. In all regressions, I use changes in energy prices to instrument for industrial PPI.
The first stage F Statistics reports the Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistics.
Theoretically, the differences in pass-through between import and domestic prices
(PPI) could be due to the differences in expenditures on imported vs domestic goods
and the variety-level pass-through. It is reasonable to assume that markup elasticity
has little variation across domestic goods and imported goods, but the distribution
margin, especially the transportation cost, could be quite different. If we define ξIg as
the import price pass-through and ξDg as the domestic price pass-through for product
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The second term, the ratio of variety pass-through could be constant across dif-
ferent income groups. In other words, the differences in distribution margin, say
transportation cost, across domestic and imported goods do not vary across high and
low income. Therefore, the differences in pass-through ratio between high and low













As we see in equation (2.12), the diverging sign on the two interaction term in Ta-
ble 2.3 captures the differences in expenditure share on imported and domestic goods.








which suggests low income households spend more on imported goods compared with
high income households. Overall, the results indicate that the different expenditure
share on imported varieties plays an important role in driving the differential pass-
through.
In addition, I investigate how each channel contributes to the higher pass-through
into lower income by decomposing the income-specific price index into three compo-
nents as in equation (2.2) and run the same regressions on each component. Table 2.4
reports the decomposition results using total reported income. As we see in column
1, the variety pass-through is higher for low income consumers but barely signifi-
cant. The result in column 2 suggests the differential expenditures across varieties
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with heterogeneous pass-through account for most of the differential effect. To be
more specific, the positive and significant sign before the interaction implies that low
income consumers spend more on varieties with higher pass-through compared with
high income consumers. As suggested by previous results, it is likely due to the fact
that lower income spend more on imported varieties. Lastly, the positive significant
sign on the interaction term (column 3) indicates that the low income consumers
also spend more on varieties that have disproportionately higher pass-through for
low income consumers. The decomposition results are similar using TPU-News as
instrument.
Table 2.4: Price Decomposition: Income
(1) (2) (3)
Outlet Channel Composition Channel Interaction
Changes in Import Prices 0.268*** 0.245*** -0.024***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.005)
Imp × Lower Income 0.029 0.064*** 0.012**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.005)
Industrial PPI 0.604*** 0.383*** 0.011
(0.026) (0.024) (0.006)
Income*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
N 63050 63050 63050
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. In all regressions, I use TPU*Crisis as the instrument for import
prices and changes in energy prices to instrument for industrial PPI.
2.3.2 Consumers at Different Locations
In this section, I investigate whether the import price pass-through into consumer
prices varies across locations. A recent literature shows that the differences in prices
across locations within countries are driven by both trade costs and markups (Atkin
and Donaldson 2015, Hottman 2017). Note that these two factors play an important
role in determining the pass-through in our theoretical model as trade costs account
for a large fraction of distributional cost and markup captures local market structure.
The consumer prices at different locations could therefore respond differently to price
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shocks at the dock.
To proceed, I calculate the consumer price index for 50 markets in the US using
Nielsen consumer panel, with the price index defined as in equation (2.1).7 As in
calculating income-specific price indices, we allow for market-specific expenditure
shares and unit prices. I focus on two dimensions of locations. The first one is
remoteness, which is a proxy for domestic distribution/trade cost. The second one is
local market competition, which could play an important role in determining markup
and markup elasticity. In the following, I discuss how I construct these measures and
how each of them could affect pass-through into consumer prices across markets.
First, to capture the remoteness of each location, I measure minimum distance
using information on each market’s distance to ports and port-level imports. To be




ln dzp × spg (2.13)
where dzp is the distance of market z to port p, which is calculated as the fastest
route using Google Maps and spg is the import share of port p of product g. I include
372 sea and land ports in the US and the port-level imports are available through US
Census Bureau.8
Consumers at relatively remote locations might have different consumption basket
from those by the coastline. In particular, they may consume less imported goods
as there is higher distribution cost. Moreover, consumer prices of imported goods at
remote locations contain larger proportion of non-tradable domestic transportation
costs, thus having a higher distribution margin. Both channels could result in a
7Nielsen defined 52 major scantrack markets with each market contains urban and suburban
areas. I combine Suburban New York, Exurban New York and urban New York into one area as New
York. Note that according to Nielsen, the sample of households in each market is representative of
the whole population in that market. The market definition is also used in Handbury and Weinstein
(2014).
8I dropped ports outside US mainland including those in Hawaii, Virgin Island, Puerto Rico and
Alaska.
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smaller pass-through rate to remote locations.
Second, to measure the competition in local market, I construct Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) in retail industry for each market using the information
on market share of each retailer in Nielsen data. Each transaction in Nielsen data
includes information on the retail stores and retail chains. I define a retailer as the
latter as evidence shows that the pricing decisions are often made at the retail chain
level (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019).
There are 849 different retailers in total and the median number of retailers operate
in each market-product cell is 46. To test the robustness, I also construct alternative
concentration measures using market shares of top 4, 8, 20 retailers following Autor
et al (2014). To avoid endogeneity, all concentration measures are constructed using
aggregate sales across products.
Models with oligopolistic competition would predict that firm’s markup elasticity
depends on its market share (Atkenson and Burnstein(2008)). Furthermore, using
firm-level data, Amiti et al (2018) show that larger firms respond to its own cost
shock with elasticity of 0.5, while small firms exhibit complete pass-through. As the
import price pass-through varies across firms of different size, it could therefore vary
across locations with different size distribution of firms, which is captured by market
concentration measures.
Moreover, the remoteness and competition conditions in one market could be
correlated. For example, the more remote market might exhibit less competition.
Thus, we estimate the following equation:
∆ lnPzgt =α + β∆ lnP
I
gt + γ1∆ lnP
I
gt ×Distzg + γ2∆ lnP Igt × Concentrz
+ ρ∆ lnPDgt + δg + δzt + εzgt
(2.14)
where on the left hand side is the changes in market-specific price index of product
g for market z. On the right hand side, I add the interactions of changes in import
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prices with both remoteness and concentration measures. As before, I control for
domestic prices through PPI and add product and market-time fixed effects.
Table 2.5: Import Price Pass-through across Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in Import Prices 0.161** 0.160** 0.170** 0.194***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Changes in Import Prices × Distw 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Changes in Import Prices × HHI -0.020**
(0.010)
Changes in Import Prices × Top 4 -0.014
(0.010)
Changes in Import Prices × Top 8 -0.024**
(0.010)
Changes in Import Prices × Top 20 -0.042***
(0.010)
Industrial PPI 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 0.263***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
First Stage F-Statistics 148.72 125.21 137.89 112.19
Market*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 298639 298639 298639 298639
Notes: ***p¡0.01, **p¡0.05, *p¡0.1. In all regressions, I use TPU*Crisis as an instrument for import prices and
changes in energy prices to instrument for industrial PPI.
Table 2.5 represents the regression results based on IV estimation. In terms of
concentration measures, I use Herfindahl index, market shares of top four, eight and
twenty retailers respectively in column 1-4. As we see across columns, the remoteness
have no impact on the pass-through. One possible explanation is that distribution
margin includes not only transportation costs, but also various other costs such as
marketing, labor, rent. Some of the costs might work in the opposite direction of
transportation costs, thus causing the coefficient to be insignificant.9
The concentration in retail industry has a negative and significant effect on the
pass-through rate, suggesting that the pass-through to more concentrated market
is lower. To explain it, consider the previously mentioned findings that cost pass-
9For example, rent and labor costs might be less expensive in more remote places.
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through is lower for larger firms. The more concentrated market is dominated with a
few large retailers which generally have lower pass-through, thus making the average
pass-through lower for that market.
Table 2.6: Import Price Pass-through across Markets: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in Import Prices 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.067* 0.028
(0.015) (0.015) (0.034) (0.026)
Changes in Import Prices × Distw 0.035*** 0.030** 0.109*** 0.117***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.027) (0.026)
Changes in Import Prices × HHI 0.027 -0.085
(0.015) (0.061)
Changes in Import Prices × Top8 0.037* -0.099**
(0.015) (0.030)
PPI 0.224*** 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.213***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
PPI × Distw -0.081* -0.093**
(0.036) (0.036)
PPI × HHI 0.144
(0.080)
PPI × Top8 0.148***
(0.034)
First Stage F-Statistics 149.94 134.53 25.93 41.19
Product*County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 279285 279285 279285 279285
R-Squared 0.280 0.277 0.269 0.275
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. In all regressions, I use TPU*Crisis as an instrument for import
prices and changes in energy prices to instrument for industrial PPI.
There might be different trend in prices of different product across different mar-
kets. Therefore I add the product-by-market fixed effect in Table 2.6. As we can
see in the first two columns, the pass-through is increasing with remoteness measure
and the sign on concentration interactions becomes positive, suggesting pass-through
is higher more more concentrated market. The results are at odds with previous
results without product-market fixed effects, thus raising concerns on the robustness
of previous results.
Moreover, in column 3-4, I add the interaction between PPI and concentra-
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tion/remoteness measures. Both the interactions between remoteness and concentra-
tion are in the opposite signs with import prices, suggesting they are mostly driven
by different expenditure shares between imported vs domestic goods.
I repeat the price decomposition exercise for markets. Table 2.7 shows the de-
composition results. As we see, the variety pass-through is not significantly different
across market with different concentration levels, while the differential expenditure
patterns across markets explains all of the differential effect. The negative and signif-
icant sign before the interaction term in column 2 suggests that consumers in more
concentrated markets tend to spend more on varieties that have lower pass-through.
It is consistent with the fact that large retailers have lower pass-through and con-
sumers in more concentrated markets tend to spend more on varieties from large
retailers.
Table 2.7: Price Decomposition: Markets
(1) (2) (3)
Outlet Channel Composition Channel Interaction
Changes in Import Prices 0.172*** 0.033 -0.052
(0.042) (0.034) (0.028)
Imp × Distw 0.002 0.005* 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Imp × HHI 0.003 -0.022*** 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Industrial PPI 0.927*** 0.065** -0.003
(0.027) (0.022) (0.018)
Market*Time FE Yes Yes Yes
N 347400 347400 347400
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. In all regressions, I use TPU*Crisis as an instrument for import
prices and changes in energy prices to instrument for industrial PPI.
2.3.3 Pass-through into Different Markets: County-level Ev-
idence
Retail market competition is mostly at the local level as it is very costly for consumers
to purchase goods far away from home (Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Trachter, 2018;
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Argarwal, Jensen and Monte, 2020). Previously we define a market as a Nielsen
defined “scantrack market”. The advantage is that it has a large and representative
sample of households in each location, but the limitation is that its size is too large
to be counted as a single local retail market. For example, one scantrack market
contains 31 counties on average. Therefore, we repeat the exercise by narrowing our
market definition as a county.
Table 2.8: County-level Pass-Through
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in Import Prices 0.083*** 0.060*** 0.087*** 0.065***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Import Price × HHI -0.014** -0.016*** -0.009 -0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Import Price × Dist 0.034*** 0.028*
(0.006) (0.011)
PPI 0.627*** 0.586*** 0.635*** 0.593***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
PPI × HHI 0.124*** 0.133***
(0.018) (0.018)
PPI × Dist 0.007
(0.012)
Product*County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2273224 2273224 2273224 2273224
R-Squared 0.288 0.293 0.287 0.292
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. In all regressions, I use TPU*Crisis as an instrument
for import prices and changes in energy prices to instrument for industrial PPI. Both HHI and
Distance variables are market-product specific.
The results, as reported in Table 2.8, indicate that the pass-through of import
prices is lower for more concentrated county, which is consistent with previous scant-
rack market level results. In column 2, we also find the pass-through is higher for
more distant county, which contradicts with our prediction. One possible explanation
is that the more remote market might have lower labor cost or rent, which outweighs
the effect of higher transportation cost.
In addition, we find that the domestic price pass-through is higher for more con-
centrated market (column 3-4), which is in the opposite sign with the pass-through
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of import prices. It provides us with additional evidence on which factor drives the
different pass-through across markets. As it is reasonable to assume retailers’ markup
elasticity varies little with regard to import price shock or domestic price shock, the
differences sign might capture the differences in expenditure share on imported vs do-
mestic goods across markets with different concentration levels.10 That is, consumers
in more concentrated county purchase less imported varieties and more domestic
varieties compared with those in less concentrated county. Lastly, we find the pass-
through of domestic prices does not vary across markets with different distance to
port, which makes sense as it mainly captures the transportation cost for imported
good. The results are robust to use market-level concentration measures.
2.4 Quantification Exercises
The goal of the exercise is to assess the effect of trade war on consumer prices using our
estimates on pass-through rate. Suppose the US imposes a 25% tariff on all consumer
goods from China, which is highly likely as the Trump Administration already imposes
15% tariffs on 125 billion imports from China that includes considerable amount of
consumer goods starting Sep 4, 2019 and threatens to increase these tariffs further.
Based on recent findings of complete tariff pass-through into import prices during
the trade war (Amiti et al (2019); Fajgelbaum et al (2019)), I take the tariff changes
as the changes in import prices. Therefore, the log changes in import prices of product
g at period t are:






Assuming the import prices from the unaffected countries constant, the increase
in import prices of product g equals to the share of imports from China times the
10Import price shock and domestic price shock are both cost shock for retailers.
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increase in prices of Chinese imports.11 For the expenditure share on Chinese imports
of all imports, I use the average expenditure share on Chinese imports among Nielsen
goods, which is 0.185. Thus, the import prices of affected products increase 4% on
average.
Table 2.9: Increases in Consumer Prices in response to Tariffs
(1) (2) (3)
Aggregate Prices Lower Income Higher Income
Changes in Consumer Prices 1.2% 1.53% 1.07%
Adjusted for Domestic Prices 4.4% 3.71% 3.37%
Estimated Pass-Through Rate 0.3 0.38 0.27
Notes: The estimated pass-through rates are based on regressions using TPU*Crisis as instruments. The increases
in domestic prices are calculated using a pass-through rate of 0.5 for aggregate prices. The domestic pass-through
is 0.393 for lower income and 0.413 for higher income.
From our estimates in Table 1.2 , the pass-through from an increase in import
price to aggregate consumer prices is about 0.3-0.4. Keeping the prices of domestic
goods g and prices of non-tradables constant, the log changes in consumer prices of
product g are given by ∆ lnPgt = θ∆ lnP
T
gt, which are a product of pass-through and
changes in import prices. For an average product with a 4% increase in import prices,
the increase in consumer prices ranges from roughly 1.2% to 1.6%.
As discussed in the first chapter, due to strategic complementarity and changes
in product cost, the domestic prices would increase as well in response to increases
in import price. I therefore calculate the indirect effect on consumer prices through
the changes in domestic prices. Overall, a 4% increase in import prices would lead
to a 4.4% increase in consumer prices, which is significantly higher than previous
estimates by only taking into account the direct effect. Our estimates are consistent
with findings in the literature. For example, Fajgelbaum et al (2019) find a positive
relationship between domestic PPI and import tariffs during the US-China trade
11Note that the tariff-inclusive import price of product g from country i is PTigt = (1 + τigt)P
∗
igt,
where P ∗igt is the price exporters charge. Thus ∆ lnP
T
igt = ln(1 + τigt), if we assume complete
pass-through and zero tariffs at base period.
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war.12 By estimating the response of PPI for changes in import prices instead of
import tariffs, our estimates are slightly larger in magnitude.13
Figure 2.1: Changes in Consumer Prices across US markets
To see how the increases in import prices translate to differential changes in con-
sumer prices, I apply the estimates of consumer-specific pass-through rates. I find
that a 25% tariff leads to a 1.53% increase in consumer prices for lower income house-
holds and a 1.07% increase for higher income households. If we take into account the
increase in domestic prices, the numbers become 3.71% for low income and 3.37% for
high income.
Figure 2.1 shows the impact of trade war on consumer prices across markets,
where the darker color represents a larger increase in consumer prices.14 As we see,
consumers in large cities of the Northeast region and Western Coast experienced
larger increases in consumer prices, while consumers in the South received the least
impact. Meanwhile, the Mountain West and Midwest experienced modest increases in
12Amiti et al (2019) has similar findings by distinguishing between input tariffs and output tariffs.
13They estimate a tariff elasticity of 0.13, indicating that a 25% increase in tariffs would lead
to a 2.9% increase in domestic prices. Multiplying it with the domestic price pass-through (about
0.5) we estimate, it would result in an additional 1.45% increase in consumer price index. Adding
it together, the consumer prices of affected goods would increase by 2.65% to 3.05% on average.
14The pass-through across markets are calculated by taking into account of different concentration
levels in the form of HHI. The effect of distance is not accounted for it is not precisely estimated.
The increases in consumer prices for each market is reported in Appendix.
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consumer prices. The differential effects are mostly driven by the differences in retail
industry concentration across markets. That is, the large cities usually have more
competitive retail market while small cities have less competition in retail industries.
Using a general equilibrium quantitative model, Fajgelbaum et al (2019) estimate
that prices of tradable goods increased 1.5% on average during the trade war, which
is consistent with our estimates before taking into account of domestic prices. Across
different regions, they find that counties in Rust Belt and Southeast experienced
relatively large increase in nominal wages in tradable sector. However, according to
my estimates, some of the Rust Belt cities such as Pittsburgh, Detroit and Baltimore
have relatively high pass-through rates and therefore experience larger increases in
cost of living during the trade war.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter explores the heterogeneity in pass-through rates across consumers by
extending the framework to allow consumer-specific prices. I find the pass-through
rate is higher for consumers with lower income and at more competitive markets. The
results are robust to using alternative income and concentration measures.
I distinguish two channels that could cause differential pass-through. The first
one captures that fact that consumers shop in different retail outlets for the same
variety (UPC) and thus face differential retail price adjustment following an import
price shock. The second channel focuses on the different expenditure shares across
varieties and heterogeneous pass-through across varieties within a narrow product
category. A price decomposition shows that for consumers with different income, both
variety pass-through and differential expenditure shares contribute to the higher pass-
through into consumer prices of lower income, with the latter plays a more important
role. For consumer prices across markets with different concentration, the variety
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pass-through is not significantly different across markets. However, consumers in
more concentrated markets spend more on varieties with lower pass-through.
I then provide a quantification on the effect of trade war on consumer prices
based on my estimates. I find that the consumer prices are estimated to increase
1.2% to 1.6% in response to 25% tariffs on Chinese imports of consumer goods. In
addition, I find that a 25% tariffs lead to 1.53% increase in consumer prices for
lower income households and 1.07% increase for higher income households. Across
locations, consumers in big cities of the Northeast and Western Coast experienced





Table 2.A.1: Pass-Through Across Income: Unadjusted Income
Reported Income Total Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Changes in Import Prices 0.016*** 0.083* 0.006 0.004*** 0.323*** 0.218***
(0.002) (0.040) (0.038) (0.001) (0.039) (0.036)
Imp × Lower Income 0.028*** 0.324*** 0.311*** 0.001 0.052** 0.058***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.014) (0.002) (0.016) (0.014)
Industrial PPI 0.253*** 0.096*** 0.142*** 0.316*** 0.109*** 0.166***
(0.013) (0.027) (0.025) (0.013) (0.026) (0.024)
Instrument TPU × Crisis TPU × News TPU × Crisis TPU × News
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 68537 66233 66233 75201 72681 72681
Table 2.A.2: Income Adjusted for Household Size and other demographics
Reported Income Total Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Changes in Import Prices 0.007*** 0.291*** 0.194*** 0.007*** 0.335*** 0.240***
(0.002) (0.039) (0.037) (0.001) (0.040) (0.036)
Imp × Lower Income 0.007*** 0.102*** 0.093*** 0.001 0.056*** 0.061***
(0.002) (0.016) (0.014) (0.002) (0.016) (0.014)
Industrial PPI 0.307*** 0.104*** 0.160*** 0.321*** 0.108*** 0.159***
(0.013) (0.027) (0.025) (0.013) (0.027) (0.025)
Instrument TPU × Crisis TPU × News TPU × Crisis TPU × News
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 75220 72700 72700 75213 72693 72693
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Table 2.A.3: Total Spending: Decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variety Pass-through Expenditure Patterns Interaction
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Changes in Import Prices 0.010*** 0.469*** 0.322*** -0.003** -0.122*** -0.076*** 0.001 -0.018 -0.016
(0.001) (0.046) (0.035) (0.001) (0.021) (0.022) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011)
Imp × Lower Income 0.001 0.018 0.013 0.002 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.002* -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.018) (0.014) (0.002) (0.012) (0.011) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Industrial PPI 0.370*** 0.109*** 0.189*** -0.058*** -0.010 -0.037** 0.001 0.011* 0.010
(0.013) (0.032) (0.025) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Instrument TPU × Crisis TPU × News TPU × Crisis TPU × News TPU× Crisis TPU × News
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 72560 70040 70040 72560 70040 70040 72560 70040 70040
Table 2.A.4: Changes in Consumer Prices across Markets
Market Pass-Through Increase in Consumer Prices Domestic Adjusted
Philadelphia 0.194 0.80% 1.52%
Sacramento 0.190 0.79% 1.51%
Washington DC 0.189 0.78% 1.50%
Suburban NY 0.187 0.77% 1.49%
Baltimore 0.185 0.77% 1.48%
Syracuse 0.185 0.76% 1.48%
Cleveland 0.183 0.76% 1.48%
Los Angeles 0.179 0.74% 1.46%
San Diego 0.178 0.73% 1.45%
Omaha 0.178 0.73% 1.45%
Boston 0.176 0.73% 1.45%
Salt Lake City 0.175 0.72% 1.44%
Kansas City 0.175 0.72% 1.44%
St. Louis 0.175 0.72% 1.44%
Seattle 0.174 0.72% 1.44%
Portland OR 0.172 0.71% 1.43%
Indianapolis 0.169 0.70% 1.42%
Phoenix 0.169 0.70% 1.42%
Richmond 0.169 0.70% 1.42%
Raleigh - Durham 0.169 0.70% 1.42%
Chicago 0.167 0.69% 1.41%
Hartford - New Haven 0.167 0.69% 1.41%
Pittsburgh 0.166 0.68% 1.40%
Charlotte 0.165 0.68% 1.40%
Detroit 0.165 0.68% 1.40%
Atlanta 0.165 0.68% 1.40%
Albany 0.165 0.68% 1.40%
San Francisco 0.165 0.68% 1.40%
Minneapolis 0.163 0.67% 1.39%
Jacksonville 0.163 0.67% 1.39%
Notes: The third column is the increase in consumer prices after adjusting for the increase in domestic manufacturing prices.
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Table 2.A.5: Changes in Consumer Prices across Markets (Continued)
Market Pass-Through Increase in Consumer Prices Domestic Adjusted
Dallas 0.163 0.67% 1.39%
Houston 0.161 0.66% 1.38%
Denver 0.158 0.65% 1.37%
Oklahoma City - Tulsa 0.154 0.64% 1.36%
Orlando 0.152 0.63% 1.34%
Columbus 0.151 0.62% 1.34%
Memphis 0.149 0.62% 1.34%
Milwaukee 0.148 0.61% 1.33%
Buffalo - Rochester 0.148 0.61% 1.33%
Tampa 0.145 0.60% 1.32%
Cincinnati 0.143 0.59% 1.31%
Des Moines 0.143 0.59% 1.31%
Nashville 0.140 0.58% 1.30%
Birmingham 0.139 0.58% 1.29%
New Orleans - Mobile 0.132 0.55% 1.27%
Louisville 0.130 0.54% 1.26%
Grand Rapids 0.124 0.51% 1.23%
Miami 0.123 0.51% 1.23%
Little Rock 0.122 0.50% 1.22%
San Antonio 0.103 0.42% 1.14%
Notes: The third column is the increase in consumer prices after adjusting for the increase in domestic manufacturing prices.
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Chapter 3
Trade Policy Uncertainty and US
Imports in the Trade War
3.1 Introduction
Starting from Jan 2018, the Trump administration has implemented a series of trade
policies that substantially increased trade barriers into the US, or the so called “trade
war”. The average import tariffs on imports from China rose from 3.1% on Jan 2018
to 21% on Jan 2020 (Bown, 2019). At the same time, the uncertainty about trade
policy surged as well. Figure 1 plots the news-based trade policy uncertainty index
(solid blue line) developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) as well as the timing of
tariff increase announcement (vertical lines). As we see, the uncertainty about trade
policy increases substantially over the course of the “trade war” and reaches its peak
on August 2019, when the US announced tariffs on $300 billion imports from China.
This chapter aims to evaluate the effect of trade policy uncertainty on US imports
during the “trade war” episode. The key challenge in identifying the effect of TPU
on imports is how to separate it from the effect of increases in import tariffs. Unlike
previous studies on trade policy uncertainty where the changes in tariffs are minimal,
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Figure 3.1: Trade Policy Uncertainty and Import Tariff Waves
Notes: TPU and EPU indices are from Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). Grey vertical lines denote timing of an-
nouncement of tariff waves targeting on solar panels & washing machines, and steel & aluminum. Green vertical lines
represent tariff waves on Chinese imports, which are categorized into 5 waves with detailed definition in section 2.
the threat to increase trade barriers realized during this period, which makes it diffi-
cult to disentangle the effect of uncertainty from the anticipation effect of tariffs. To
address this problem, I exploit the variations in uncertainty after tariff announcement
across different products according to its changes in risk, which can be considered as
exogeneous.
As shown in Figure 1, the trade policy uncertainty peaks when new tariffs were
announced.1 Intuitively, when the U.S. proposes or threatens additional tariffs, the
probability of worst-case scenario (higher trade barrier) increases while there are also
chances the proposed tariffs would cancel if both sides reach an agreement, which
indicates an increase in trade policy uncertainty (TPU) in the framework of Handley
and Limão (2017). However, when the higher tariffs realize, the products are in a high
protection state. Though there is still uncertainty about whether the tariffs would
1Note that the first two waves of tariffs on imports from China are announced at the same time,
on April 2018.
54
Figure 3.2: Trade Policy Uncertainty During Wave 4/5
Notes: The two waves are announced at the same time, Aug 2019. Wave 4 went to effect on Sep 1, 2019 and wave 5
was scheduled to take effect on Dec 15, 2019 until it is cancelled during December 2019.
escalate or cancel, the overall uncertainty level decreases. To be more clear, Figure 2
shows how the TPU index involves in the course of the final two waves, which target
$300 billion imports from China. The figure shows that the uncertainty is the highest
when the tariffs are announced and much lower when the tariffs realize.2 For this
wave, there is a slightly increase in uncertainty in December when Trump canceled
December tariffs and a decrease when Phase one deal with China was announced.
The other waves exhibit similar patterns though there are some overlapping periods
between different waves.
Motivated by these facts, if a product is announced to have tariff increases in
the near future, I assume that the probability of tariff increases for this product
increases. However, the risk level of each product, which is defined as the profit loss
if worse case scenario realizes according to Handley and Limão (2017), changes into
different directions after tariff announcement. More specifically, if a product’s prior
belief about worst-case tariff is higher than the announced tariff level, which could be
2Note that the high uncertainty level in August, 2019 includes not only uncertainty about import
tariffs, but also the uncertainty about retaliation.
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thought as the updated belief about tariffs, the risk faced by this product surprisingly
decreases after the announcement. Note that the changes in risk for each product
are independent from the probability of tariff change, which is often captured by the
overall TPU index and does not vary across products in the same wave. Therefore,
the changes in overall uncertainty, which depends on both the probability of tariff
increases and the changes in risk, can be different across products. In particular, the
products with risk increases would have higher uncertainty after tariff announcement
as both factors increases. However, the changes in uncertainty faced by products with
risk decreases are ambiguous as the probability increases but the risk falls.
I employ a diff-in-diff identification strategy by comparing the differences in im-
ports before and after the tariff announcement across products with different changes
in risk. If the stockpiling does not vary across products with different changes in risk,
its effect would cancel out using our DID strategy. However, as the stockpiling behav-
ior might be correlated with additional tariffs, I control for the anticipated increase
in tariffs during announcement period to further separate the effect of TPU from the
anticipation effect.
Another concern is that the changes in risk might be correlated with other product-
level shocks, thus subject to omitted variable bias. Given that the column-2 tariffs
were set in the Smoot-Harley Act of 1930 and the additional tariffs are almost uniform
in one wave. It is reasonable to assume the changes in risk, which are constructed by
comparing the two tariff rates, are exogeneous to other product-level shocks.
I find that uncertainty reduces imports as the decline in imports after tariff an-
nouncement is larger for products with higher increase in uncertainty (risk). In fact,
for products with average expected increase in tariffs, those with an increase in risk
experience lower imports after tariff announcement whereas those with a decrease in
risk experience higher imports. I also find the anticipation effect is more pronounced
for products with higher expected increase in tariffs, which is consistent with the
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findings in Alessandria et al (2019).
I find the intensive margin, the adjustment within HS10 products, plays a more
important role in reducing imports. There is no significant difference in entry and
exit rate across products with different changes in risk. However, I find lower product
entry after tariff announcement for almost all products, which can be seen as evidence
of higher uncertainty, in particular, higher probability of tariff increases, reduced
product entry.
I also examine the uncertainty during the pre-war period (2014m1-2017m12) and
find that the higher trade policy uncertainty caused by Trump’s election led to lower
imports for higher risk industries at HS6 digit level, where the risk is measured as the
difference between column-2 and mfn tariffs. The results inform us that the column-2
tariffs are valid conjecture on firms’ prior belief about worst-case tariff rates before
the trade war.
Literature This chapter contributes to the growing literature on trade policy
uncertainty. Handley and Limão (2017) examine how the decrease in trade policy
uncertainty through China’s accession to WTO contributes to the export boom from
China to the US. Using Chinese firm-level data, Feng, Li and Swenson (2017) investi-
gate how the same event affects Chinese firms’ entry and exit decisions. Other studies
focus on how the trade agreements, especially PTAs, affect export and its dynamics in
different contexts (Handley and Limão(2015); Carballo, Handley and Limão (2018)).
These studies mostly examine the effect of TPU reduction on exports. However, in
recent years, there is an upward trend in trade policy uncertainty around the world
and the uncertainty reaches its peak during the trade war episode. Therefore, it is of
interest to see if the increase in uncertainty has non-asymmetric effect on exports or
imports. Some recent studies have started to look at the effect of increases in uncer-
tainty in different contexts. For example, Crowley, Song and Meng (2018) find that
Chinese firms less likely to enter and more likely to exit if they face a rise in trade
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policy uncertainty. More recently, Graziano, Handley and Limão(2019) examine the
effect of Brexit on EU-UK exports and find that an increase in probability of Brexit
reduces EU-UK exports and net export entry. A closely related paper, Alessandria,
Khan and Khederlarian (2019), examines the effect of increases in trade policy uncer-
tainty on US imports from China during 1991-2000 when China faced annual MFN
status renewal. This paper complements the literature in the following ways:
First, this paper is the first one to explore the changes in firms’ belief about
(worst-case) tariffs during an event. Previous studies mostly focus on the events that
led to an increase in probability of tariff increase (decrease) with the worst-case tariffs
constant throughout the event. Therefore, it allows us to develop a new identification
strategy by exploiting the differential changes in risk across products before and after
the event.
Second, unlike previous events that there is a one time change in uncertainty which
applies to all products, the uncertainty changes continuously during this period as new
wave of tariffs are announced. Moreover, the changes in uncertainty, in particular,
the probability of tariff increase, are different across products with those covered in
the announcement have higher uncertainty. This setting would be useful for us to
probably examine the spillover effect of uncertainty on products that are not targeted.
Third, in contrast to other events where the threat to increase trade barriers rarely
realize, during this episode, the additional tariffs actually took effect, which enables
us to compare the effect of TPU vs the increased trade barriers on imports.
This chapter is also related to the recent literature studying the effect of trade
war on US imports and other outcomes (Amiti et al (2019); Fajgelbaum et al (2019)).
They find that the imposed tariffs reduce import value of affected products and raise
prices for the US firms and consumers. Instead of tariffs, this paper mainly focuses
on the effect of trade policy uncertainty on US imports, which might be an important
force in reducing US imports from China during current period and play an important
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role on US-China trade in the long run.
3.2 Background and Stylized Facts
The “trade war” episode started when President Trump approved tariffs on imports
of solar panels and washing machines on January 2018. Later in March 2018, the US
announced tariffs on steel and aluminum for all trading partners.3
In April 2018, the Trump administration announced additional 25 percent tariffs
on $50 billion imports from China based on their investigation under Section 301.
Through almost two years (2018-19), the US has imposed five waves of tariffs on
imports from China, covering $522 billion imports from China. Those imports account
for 90% of total imports from China in 2018. Though the 5th wave of tariffs were
cancelled in December 2019 due to the Phase One Deal with China, the tariffs in
place still cover 63% of total imports from China. At the same time, China retaliates
with several rounds of tariffs on American goods.
This paper focuses on the effect of both trade policy uncertainty and five waves of
tariffs on imports from China. More specifically, the five waves of tariffs are defined
as follows:4
• wave 1: 25 percent tariffs on $34 billion imports, announced on April 3, 2018,
effective on July 6, 2018.
• wave 2: 25 percent tariffs on $16 billion imports, announced on April 3, 2018,
effective on August 23, 2018.
• wave 3: 10 percent tariffs on $200 billion imports, announced on July 10, 2018,
effective on Sep 24, 2018, increased to 25 percent on May 10, 2019.
3There were tariff exemptions on specific partners such NAFTA and EU later.
4Thanks to Chad Bown for summarizing the timeline of the trade war.
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• wave 4: 15 percent tariffs on $112 billion imports, announced on August 1,2019,
effective on September 1, 2019.
• wave 5: 15 percent tariffs on $160 billion imports, announced on August 1,2019,
planned to take effect on December 15, 2019, cancelled in December, 2019.
To see how the imports of each wave evolve during this period, I plot the imports
from China that are hit by the first two waves of tariffs and also the imports from
China that are not subject to 2018 tariffs (labelled as control group).5 Note that
both waves are announced at the same time - April, 2018 - and are implemented in
two phases, with the first wave (blue line) took effect on July 6th, 2018 and second
wave (red line) on Aug 23, 2018. The orange vertical line denotes the month of
announcement and the two grey lines denote the months of implementation.
As Figure 3 makes clear, the imports of wave 1 and control group were basically
following the same trend before the trade war. After the announcement, the wave
1 imports didn’t immediately decrease and even increased before the tariffs actually
took effect, which might be due to the fact that firms tried to stockpile during this
period. The imports of both waves decline sharply in the month the tariffs took effect
and continue to decrease in the subsequent month, which can be seen as the lagged
effect of tariffs. However, the continued decrease in imports for the next year (2019)
might indicate that uncertainty of trade policy also plays a role in dampening the
import in the longer run given that there were no tariff changes for those products
during this period. The imports of other waves exhibit similar patterns and are
reported in the Appendix Figure 3.A.1.
5Note that the later does not include imports subject to tariffs on solar and washing machines,
and tariffs on steel and aluminum. To avoid complication, it also does not include imports that are
subject to third wave of tariffs that took effect on Sep 2018.
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Figure 3.3: US Imports from China and Tariff Waves
Notes: The monthly US imports data is obtained from US Census Bureau. The imports are normalized as the
proportional changes relative to the corresponding month in 2016. Blue and red lines denote changes in imports from
China that are subject to the first two waves of tariffs. Dotted green lines represents changes in imports of control
group, which includes imports from China that are not subject to 2018 tariffs. Note that the later does not include
imports subject to tariffs on solar and washing machines, and tariffs on steel and aluminum. To avoid complication,
it also does not include imports that are subject to third wave of tariffs that took effect on Sep 2018.
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3.3 Pre-War Period
Before I formally identify the effect of TPU on imports during the trade war episode, I
first examine firms’ prior beliefs about potential tariffs and the changes in uncertainty
during the pre-war period, in particular, around Trump’s presidential election. This
analysis is important as it gives us information on how the arrival of trade war changed
uncertainty for each product.
To examine exporters’ prior beliefs about potential (worst-case) tariffs, we ex-
ploit the variation in trade policy uncertainty over time during the pre-war period
(2014m1-2017m12), in particular, the changes in uncertainty around the 2016 US
presidential election. During Trump’s presidential campaign, he frequently threat-
ened to withdraw from current trade agreements, for example NAFTA, and impose
tariffs on imports from specific countries such as Mexico and China (Handley and
Limão, 2017b). These threats substantially increased uncertainty on trade policy,
specially after he won the presidential election in Nov, 2016. Figure 3.4 plots the
news-based trade policy uncertainty index constructed by Baker et al (2016) during
the Pre-War period. As we can see, the uncertainty was at a very low level before
Trump’s campaign and there was an increase when Trump became the Republican
Presidential Candidate in May 2018. Furthermore, the TPU Index increased dramat-
ically and reached its peak after Trump’ election as the US president.
Based on these facts, we can reasonably identify the effect of uncertainty by com-
paring the imports before and after Trump’s election. Moreover, we explore the
variations in risk faced by different industries and examine if the differences in im-
ports vary across industries with high vs low risk. In terms of risk, one potential
scenario is that exporters expect the US switch to column-2 tariffs, which are the
tariffs imposed on countries with non-Normal Trade Relation (non-NTR) with the
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Figure 3.4: News-based TPU Index during the Pre-War Period
Notes: The news-based TPU index is constructed by Baker et al (2016).
US.6 Therefore, the risk faced by industry i before the trade war is gap between the
MFN tariff rate and column-2 tariff rate:




Following Handley and Limão (2017), I construct the risk variable using the
column-2 and mfn tariff rates at HTS8 level in 2016.7 Both column-2 and mfn tariffs
are calculated as the ad valorem equivalent(AVE) tariff rates.8
The hypothesis is that if the uncertainty increased after Trump’s election, we
would expect the imports are lower for higher risk products after the election. To
6Before China’s accession to WTO, the Congress voted annually to renew China’s MFN sta-
tus. If the MFN status were not renewed, the US would impose non-NTR tariffs on Chinese im-
ports.(Handley and Limão (2017); Alessandria et al(2019))
7There is little variation in column-2 tariffs across years. The reason of not using column-2 in
previous years like in Pierce and Schott (2016) is its limited coverage of new HTS8s in recent years.
More specifically, about 1/4 of HTS8s in the sample period are not covered in 2001 HTS schedule.
The column-2 tariffs for these HTS8s are therefore missing.
8According to WTO, AVE=ad valorem rate + specific rate/unit price.
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test this hypothesis, we run the following estimation
log(impvt) = βRisk
pre
i × Electiont + ln τit + δv + δt + εvt (3.2)
where on the left hand side is the monthly (log) imports of product v (HS10) from
China to the US during 2014m1-2017m12. On the right hand side, I include the
interaction between industrial (HS8) risk and an election dummy, which equals to
one after November 2016 and zero otherwise. If the uncertainty about trade policy
increased after Trump’s election, we expect β to be negative as higher risk industries
have disproportionately lower imports after uncertainty increased. In addition, I
include the product and time fixed effects to control for time-invariant product-specific
characteristics and unobserved economic shocks that affect imports equally.
Table 3.1 reports the regression results. In the first column, we can see that higher
risk industries had lower imports during the entire period, confirming that column-2
is the relevant worst-case tariff in the pre-war episode. However, there is no significant
difference in imports before and after Trump’s election. The results hold when we
control for HS10 fixed effects in column 2. The lack of effect might be due to our
definition of election dummy, which assumes a one time increase in uncertainty. Thus
in column 3-4, I replace the election dummy with the time-varying News Index, which
captures not only the increase in uncertainty during Trump’s presidential election,
but also the variations in uncertainty during Trump’s campaign, such as when he
became the Republican presidential nominee. The results are similar: there is no
significant difference in imports across periods with high or low uncertainty. Results
in column-4 suggest that there is even slightly higher imports when uncertainty is
high.
The higher uncertainty might affect the entry and exit of HS10s, which are not
captured in the HS-10 level regression. Therefore, in the following, I aggregate imports
to the HS-6 level to investigate if the uncertainty increase during Trump’s election
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Table 3.1: Imports and Uncertainty During the Pre-War Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RiskPrei -0.596*** -0.590***
(0.039) (0.038)
RiskPrei × Electiont 0.021 0.016
(0.032) (0.016)
RiskPrei ×Newst 0.016 0.015*
(0.015) (0.007)
Tariffs 0.075 -1.842* 0.075 -1.809*
(0.109) (0.745) (0.109) (0.742)
HS6 FE Yes No Yes No
HS10 FE No Yes No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 231727 231727 231727 231727
R-Squared 0.520 0.887 0.520 0.887
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. The standard error is clustered at HS10
level. Election dummy equals to one after Nov 2016. Tariffs are at HS8 level.
Table 3.2: Pre-War Episode: HS6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RiskPrei × Electiont -0.049* -0.061*
(0.021) (0.031)
RiskPrei ×Newst -0.023** -0.000
(0.011) (0.017)
Tariffs -5.995*** -2.004 -5.684*** -1.737
(1.188) (1.276) (1.180) (1.274)
HS6 FE Yes No Yes No
HS2 × Time FE No Yes No Yes
Time FE Yes No Yes No
N 157430 157278 157430 157278
R-Squared 0.899 0.904 0.899 0.904
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. Election dummy equals to one after Nov
2016. HS6-level Risk is calculated using the simple average of mfn and column-2 tariffs
within a HS6. The parameter before interaction of risk with news index includes the
current and two months lagged effect of news index.
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affects HS-6 level imports from China. Table 3.2 presents the results. As we can
see in column 1, the higher risk industries experienced lower imports after Trump’s
election. The effect is robust to controlling for sector(HS2) by time fixed effects in
column 2. As I didn’t find evidence of adjustment at HS10-level, the results suggest
that higher uncertainty caused by Trump’s election led to lower entry or higher exit
of HS10s.
I replace the election dummy with uncertainty news index in column 3-4. To
control for the lagged effect of uncertainty, I include the interaction of risk with two
monthly lags of news index. As we can see in column 3, the high the uncertainty, the
lower the imports for higher risk industries.
In sum, I find that the higher trade policy uncertainty caused by Trump’s election
led to lower imports for higher risk industries at HS6 digit level, where the risk is
measured as the difference between column-2 and mfn tariffs. The adjustment was
mostly through the entry and exit of HS10s within a HS6 instead of reduction in
HS10 level imports.
3.4 Trade War Episode
3.4.1 Theoretical Framework
To examine the effect of uncertainty during the trade war, I derive a theoretical
prediction on change in uncertainty factor and its effect on US imports from China
in the framework of Handley and Limão (2017).
The arrival of trade war, in particular, the announcement of tariffs, could indicate:
1) an increase in probability of tariff change; 2) changes in risk for each product. The
latter happens because the announced additional tariffs, which are concentrated at
10 percent or 25 percent, are different from exporters’ prior beliefs about worst-case
tariff level. It potentially changes the overall uncertainty for different products into
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opposite directions. Consider a product with prior belief on tariffs that are higher
than the announced (additional) 25 percent, the announcement of tariffs would lead
to a decrease in risk and an increase in probability of tariff changes. The overall
change in uncertainty for this product is therefore ambiguous and depends on the
relative magnitude of each force. To see it more clearly, we put it in the framework of
Handley and Limão (2017) and rewrite the uncertainty factor U(ω, γ), which governs









where the risk is defined as the ratio of potential profit loss:
Risk = 1− ω = 1− (τ2
τ1
)−σ (3.4)
Note that τ2 is the worst-case tariffs and τ1 is the current tariffs. According to
previous analysis, the prior belief about worst-case tariffs is potentially the column-2
tariff rates, which have a median of roughly 35 percent. After the announcement of
tariffs, exporters updated their beliefs on tariffs and the worst-case tariffs could be
equal to the announced tariff levels, which are not necessarily higher than the column-
2 tariff rates. Therefore, the announcement of tariffs might lead to an increase in risk
for some products but a decline in risk for others.
The other term in the equation (3.3), µ(γ), depends on the probability of policy





The announcement of tariffs in the trade war causes an increase in µ(γ) as it
raises the probability of tariff increase (γλ2 ↑) for all products. Note that the overall
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That is, the higher the risk and the higher the probability of tariff increases, the
lower the uncertainty factor. Note that U(ω, γ) < 1 and a lower uncertainty factor is
equivalent to higher uncertainty.
To see this more clearly, I re-state the uncertainty augmented gravity equation
in Handley and Limão (2017) and write it in differences between Pre-war and Post-
announcement period:
∆ lnRv = (k−σ+1)(lnUannv (ωw, γw)− lnUprev (ωp, γp))−
σ
σ − 1
k∆ ln τv−k∆ ln dv+εv
(3.7)
For products with increased risk (1 − ω ↑) during the trade war, according to
equation (3.6), we have:
∆ lnUv = lnU
war
v (ωw, γw)− lnUprev (ωp, γp) < 0 (3.8)
That is, the announcement of tariffs would decrease imports for these products be-
cause the overall uncertainty increased (lower uncertainty factor). For products with
a fall in risk (1− ω ↓), the differences in uncertainty factor are uncertain as the two
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where the τwarv equals to current MFN tariffs plus the announced additional tariffs and
column-2 represents the prior beliefs about worst-case tariffs. We would expect the







After establishing the relationship between uncertainty and imports in equation (3.7),
I propose to run the following estimation:
ln impvt =α + β1Announcevt ×∆Riskv + β2Announcevt + β3Announcevt ×∆ ln τwarv
+ β4Effectvt + β5 ln τvt + δv + δt + εvt
where Announcevt is a dummy variable that equals to one after the tariffs on
product v is announced and before the tariffs realized. It represents the increase in
probability of tariff increases (γλ2) for all affected products. The changes in risk
before and after the announcement are defined as in equation (3.9). We expect β1 to
be negative as it capture the differential effect of uncertainty on imports.
The sign of β2, which measures the differences in average import before and after
the announcement for products without changes in risk, is ambiguous. It captures not
only the effect of increases in uncertainty but also the effect of anticipatory stockpiling.
The idea is that if firms expect future, uncertain tariff increases, they tend to stockpile
before the uncertainty resolves. Alessandria et al (2019) find evidence of anticipatory
stockpiling behavior for China’s MFN status renewal during the 1990s. We find
similar pattern of imports during the trade war episode as in Figure. In sum, the
stockpiling leads to a positive β2 while the increase in uncertainty might cause a
negative β2. It is hard to disentangle each other through a single parameter.
More importantly, our difference-in-difference identification strategy separates the
effect of uncertainty from the anticipation effect. If the stockpiling behavior does not
69
vary across products with different changes in risk, the parameter of interest β1,
which compares differential import growth across products, only captures the effect
of uncertainty on imports as the stockpiling effect has been cancelled out. However,
Alessandria et al (2019) find that the higher the expected increases in tariffs, the more
stockpiling. As the magnitude of (expected) increases in tariffs might be correlated
with the changes in risk, the stockpiling might be different across products. To
address this concern, I add an interaction term of Announcevt and ∆ ln τ
war
v , which
is the expected tariff increases for product v: ln τwarv − ln τmfnv , to control for the
differential stockpiling behavior across products.
Lastly, I include a Effectvt dummy, which equals to one after the tariffs took
effect. It captures the differences in average import between the pre-war and the
after (tariff) realization period after controlling for the changes in applied tariffs.
The differences in import could be due to changes in uncertainty between the two
periods and/or the decline in imports due to stockpiling in previous period. I also
control for changes in tariffs and product, time fixed effects.
3.4.3 Data
I combine data from several data sources. The US monthly import data at HS10-level
is obtained from the US Census Bureau. The balanced sample includes HS10s that
exist in every month of 2017-2019 and accounts for about 91% of total imports from
China.
The tariffs data, which includes MFN and Column-2 tariff rates at HTS8 level
as well as additional tariffs on Chinese imports, is obtained from USITC.9 Note that
USITC tariff schedules include both ad valorem tariff rates and specific tariff rates.
We only make use of the ad valorem rates because the specific rates are almost
9The list of products that are subject to additional tariffs can be found in Chapter 99 of USITC
tariff schedules. The additional tariffs are mostly at the HTS8 level, with some exemptions on HS10
products within HTS8.
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constant during this period. Exploiting these information, I construct monthly tariffs
for Chinese imports at HS10 level. To construct the changes in risk ∆Riskv, I use the
column-2 and MFN tariff rates in 2017. To summarize, of the 2,737 HS6s imported
from China, 2,620 HS6s are hit by tariffs during this period and they account for
about 94% of the total imports from China in 2017.
The Announcevt and Effectvt dummies are constructed from the timeline of the
trade war, as summarized by Chad Bown.10 Note that if the announcement/effective
date is after 15th of a month, I count the next month as the beginning month.
For example, the second wave of tariffs took effect on Aug 23, 2018. The Effectvt
dummy equals to one starting from September 2018. Table 3.3 presents the summary
statistics.
It is worth mentioning that almost all affected products experienced one time
increase in tariffs except products in wave 3. For wave 3 products, there was a
10 percent increase in tariffs in September, 2018 (announced in June, 2018) and a
subsequent increase to 25 percent in May, 2019 (announced in the same month).
However, as there is no gap between announcement and execution in the second
announcement. The further increase is not captured in the regression.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Median N
Import (log) 12.28 2.53 12.36 340,408
Changes in Risk (∆Riskv) -0.23 0.22 -0.26 340,408
Risk Dummy (Driskv ) 0.13 0.34 0 340,408
Anticipated Tariff Increase (∆ ln τwarv ) 0.12 0.05 0.09 340,408
Announce(Binary) 0.07 0.25 0 340,408
Effective(Binary) 0.28 0.28 0 340,408
Entry 0.20 0.40 0 236,147
Exit 0.11 0.31 0 360,686
Notes: The import value are reported for the unbalanced sample.
10The timeline is available on PIIE’s website.
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3.4.4 Baseline Results
Table 3.4: TPU and Imports: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Announce 0.067*** 0.035*** 0.048*** -0.012
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Announce ×Driskv -0.063** -0.060**
(0.021) (0.021)
Announce ×∆Riskv -0.054 -0.165***
(0.032) (0.034)
Announce ×∆ ln τwarv 0.074*** 0.087***
(0.008) (0.008)
Effect 0.091*** 0.075*** 0.092*** 0.075***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Tariffs(ln τvt) -2.333*** -2.285*** -2.336*** -2.283***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
HS10 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 341276 340408 341276 340408
R-Squared 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. The standard error is clustered at HS10 level. The
anticipated tariff increase (∆ ln τwarv ) is normalized.
Table 3.4 reports the baseline results using the full, unbalanced sample of HS10-
level imports. In the first column, I interact Announce with a dummy variable Driskv ,
which equals to one if the product’s announced war tariffs are larger than column-2
tariffs and thus experienced an increase in risk after the tariff announcement.11 The
significantly negative sign before the interaction term in column 1 suggests that com-
pared with products that have a risk decrease, products that experience risk increases
have lower imports after the announcement. In column 2, I add the interaction of
announcement dummy and the anticipated increase in tariffs. The coefficient be-
fore this interaction is positive and significant, indicating the stockpiling effect is
more pronounced for products with higher anticipated increase in tariffs. This is
consistent with the findings in Alessandria et al (2019). Moreover, the results on
uncertainty is robust to adding the anticipation term. Combined with coefficients on
11Approximately 25% of HS10s have an increase in risk.
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other terms, a product with an increase in risk and average expected increase in tariffs
(∆ ln τwarv = 0) would have 2.5 log points lower imports after the announcement on
average. The higher the anticipation effect, the smaller the the decline in imports.
However, a product with a decrease in risk (Driskv = 0) and average expected increase
in tariffs has 3.5 log points higher imports after the announcement.
In column 3 and 4, I replace the risk dummy variable with the actual changes
in risk. The coefficient before the interaction term is negative but not significant
in column 3 and becomes significantly negative after I add the anticipation term
in column 4. This is probably due to the fact the anticipated increase in tariffs is
positively correlated with the changes in risk. Thus the interaction with risk can
capture the increased stockpiling if we are omitting the anticipation effect. The
negative and significant sign before the interaction with risk suggests that the larger
the increase in uncertainty, the smaller the increase in imports. In other words, higher
uncertainty reduces imports, which is consistent with our hypothesis.
The results using balanced sample of HS10s are reported in Appendix Table 3.A.1.
The interaction with the risk dummy is still negative but not significant (column 1-2),
which might be due to fact that the balanced sample omit the adjustment through
the extensive margin. We also find a smaller elasticity of risk in column 4, which is
consistent with the extensive margin hypothesis. In the next section, I replace the
import value with the entry and exit dummies to formally investigate the effect of
uncertainty on product entry and exit.
3.4.5 Product Entry and Exit
The previous results using import value suggest that extensive margin might play
a role in reducing import. In the framework of Handley and Limão (2017), a main
channel that uncertainty affects import is through the changes in entry cutoff. There-
fore, it is important to examine how the extensive margin responded to changes in
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uncertainty during this period. In the following, I examine this channel by construct-
ing an entry and exit sample and run a linear probability model. More specifically,
the entry sample includes products that were not imported in t− 12 and exit sample
are products that were imported in t − 12. Therefore, the entry is defined as prod-
ucts that were not imported in t− 12 but were imported in t while exit is defined as
products that are imported in t− 12 but not in t. Our sample, which includes entry
and exit for 2017m1-2019m12, has an average entry rate is about 20% and the exit
rate is about 11%.12
Table 3.5: Product Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Announce -0.001 -0.021** -0.006 -0.020**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Announce ×Driskv -0.011 0.002
(0.006) (0.009)
Announce ×∆Riskv -0.012 0.001
(0.010) (0.016)
Announce ×∆ ln τwarv 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.006)
Effect 0.012* 0.009 0.012* 0.009
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Tariffs(ln τvt) -0.234*** -0.354*** -0.234*** -0.354***
(0.036) (0.057) (0.037) (0.057)
HS10 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 200713 132642 200713 132642
R-Squared 0.444 0.368 0.444 0.368
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. The standard error is clustered at HS10 level. Entry
is defined as if the product that was not imported in t − 12 but exist in t. The entire entry
sample includes products that are not present in t− 12.
Table 3.5 presents the results on product entry. As we can see in column 1, there
was less product entry after tariff announcement for higher risk products. However,
the effect disappears when I control for anticipation effect in column 2. Instead, I
find that there was more product entry for products with higher expected increase
in tariffs. According to column 2, a product with average expected increase in tariffs
12To construct entry and exit for 2017, I use imports information in 2016.
74
had lower entry rate after the announcement, which can be seen as evidence of higher
uncertainty, in particular, higher probability of tariff increases, reduced product en-
try.13 The results using actual changes in risk (column 3) indicate that there was
no significant differences in product entry across products with different changes in
risk. After adding anticipation effect, the results are similar. The results are robust
to using other criteria of entry as reported in Appendix Table 3.A.2.
Table 3.6: Product Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Announce 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Announce ×Driskv -0.008 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005)
Announce ×∆Riskv -0.007 -0.006
(0.008) (0.009)
Announce ×∆ ln τwarv -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Effect 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tariffs(ln τvt) 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.152***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
HS10 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 337998 337261 337998 337261
R-Squared 0.491 0.482 0.491 0.482
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. The standard error is clustered at HS10 level.
Exit is defined as if the product that were imported in t− 12 but not imported in t.
Table 3.6 reports results on product exit. The results show no significant impact
of uncertainty on product exit. It is surprising that the entry and exit do not vary
across products with different risk. One possible explanation is that most entry and
exit at the firm-level has not been captured in the product-level data. It is also
possible that uncertainty affects entry only in industries with high fixed entry cost as
shown in Handley and Limão (2017).
13The anticipated increase in tariffs ∆ ln τwarv has been normalized to have a mean zero.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the effect of trade policy uncertainty on US import from
China during the trade war episode. By comparing the differences in imports be-
fore and after the announcement of tariffs across products, I find that the decline in
imports after tariff announcement is larger for products with higher increase in un-
certainty (risk), which suggests uncertainty reduces imports. Furthermore, I find the
intensive margin, the adjustment within HS10 products, plays a more important role
in reducing imports. There is no significant difference in entry and exit rate across
products with different changes in risk.
In addition, I find the anticipation effect is more pronounced for products with
higher expected increase in tariffs, which is consistent with the findings in Alessandria
et al (2019). I also examine the uncertainty during the pre-war period (2014m1-
2017m12) and find that the higher trade policy uncertainty caused by Trump’s election
led to lower imports for higher risk industries at HS6 digit level, where the risk is
measured as the difference between column-2 and mfn tariffs. The results inform us
that the column-2 tariffs are valid conjecture on firms’ prior belief about worst-case
tariff rates before the trade war.
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Appendix
3.A Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 3.A.1: Imports and Tariff Waves: 3-5th Waves
The first orange bar indicates the time when the wave 3 tariffs are announced. The first grey bar
denotes the time when the wave 3 tariffs went effect and the second grey bar indicates the increase
in tariffs to 25 percent for wave 3 products. The second orange bar represents the time when wave
4/5 tariffs were announced and the third grey bar denotes when the wave 4 tariffs realized.
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Table 3.A.1: TPU and Imports: Balanced Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Announce 0.077*** 0.047*** 0.077*** 0.012
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
Announce ×Driskv -0.030 -0.034
(0.025) (0.024)
Announce ×∆Riskv 0.012 -0.122**
(0.034) (0.038)
Announce ×∆ ln τwarv 0.067*** 0.076***
(0.007) (0.008)
Effect 0.109*** 0.094*** 0.109*** 0.094***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Tariffs(ln τvt) -2.282*** -2.239*** -2.281*** -2.238***
(0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111)
HS10 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 221635 221383 221635 221383
R-Squared 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. The standard error is clustered at HS10 level.
The anticipated tariff increase (∆ ln τwarv ) is normalized. The balanced sample only includes
HS10s that were imported in every month of 2017-2019. Those HS10s account for 92% of total
imports from China in 2017.
Table 3.A.2: Product Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Announce -0.000 -0.019 -0.006 -0.020*
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
Announce ×Driskv -0.012* -0.005
(0.006) (0.011)
Announce ×∆Riskv -0.012 -0.001
(0.010) (0.019)
Announce ×∆ ln τwarv 0.017* 0.017*
(0.008) (0.008)
Effective 0.015** 0.016 0.015** 0.016
(0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Tariffs(ln τvt) -0.155*** -0.257*** -0.156*** -0.257***
(0.035) (0.068) (0.035) (0.068)
HS10 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 154255 85401 154255 85401
R-Squared 0.431 0.362 0.431 0.362
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.005, *p<0.01. The standard error is clustered at HS10 level.
Entry is defined as if the product that was not imported in t − n, where n = 11, 12, 13, but
was imported in t. The entire entry sample includes products that are not present in t− 12.
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